Monthly Archives: August 2016

Paddy Power Betfair Revisited

It has been about 10 months since I posted on the potential for the Paddy Power and Betfair merger and a lot has happened since. Brexit and the resulting sterling volatility are obvious events of significance. In the betting sector, consolidation has continued with the Ladbrokes and Gala Coral merger having been announced and approved. The audacious proposed tie up by Rank and 888 on William Hill floundered with recent press reports suggesting Rank and 888 could get together. The consolidation in this rapidly changing sector is far from over.

The initial optimism on the future prospects for the two high achieving entities, Paddy Power and Betfair, resulted in the share price trading above the £100 level earlier in the year. Following Brexit, it traded as low as £80. The merged firm reported their H1 figures earlier this week which showed the full extent of the merger costs and provided an increased cost synergies figure for 2017 of £65 million. With 75% of EBITDA being sterling based, the currency impact was not as material as their multi-jurisdictional operations would suggest.

Top-line results for H1 do however indicate that 2016 revenue growth will likely not be as high as the 17% I had expected in November. The reality of issues in this regulated and highly competitive sector also served as a reminder that the path may not be as smooth as initially hoped for. Regulatory headwinds in Australia were an example. As a result, I revised my revenue estimates in November from £1.64 billion to £1.51 billion. The graph below shows the breakdown of my revenue estimates for the next few years with a comparison to overall average analyst estimates.

click to enlargePaddy Power Betfair pro-forma revenue split August 2016

Also, I have revised my previous earnings estimates with an operating profit margin of 20% for 2016, growing to 22% in 2017 and 23% in 2018. Based upon a share count of 86 million as at end June 2016 (which includes 2 million treasury shares), I estimate the H2 EPS at £1.55 which when added to the H1 EPS of £1.45 gives a full year 2016 EPS of £3.02.[ This 2016 estimate does represent an operating EPS of £3.79 which compares to my November estimate of £3.85 albeit that the November estimate was based upon suspect figures like the share count!!]. At today’s share price of £95.65, the PE multiple for 2016 is a hefty 31.6. The graph below shows the multiple based on my EPS estimates for 2016, 2017 and 2018 compared to those using the average analyst estimates.

click to enlargePaddy Power Betfair PE Multiples 2016 to 2018

In conclusion, I remain optimistic about the business model of Paddy Power Betfair particularly given the proven quality of the management team and their history of execution. However, quality doesn’t come cheap and the current valuation is priced for perfection. For new investors, it may be prudent to wait for a better entry point.

Level3 hiccup

I have posted on one of my major holdings Level 3 (ticker LVLT), a facilities-based provider of a range of integrated telecommunications services, many times before, most recently here. One of the features of LVLT is its volatility and the past weeks have proven no exception. LVLT broke below $50 in late June to $47 before being buoyed to above $56 by a unsubstantiated rumour that the firm was “reviewing strategic alternatives to maximize holder value, including outright sale or large buyback”. After the quarterly report on the 27th of July when LVLT reported disappointing revenues but beat on the bottom line, the stock is now down below $50 again without any news from the firm on buybacks or M&A.

The revenue figures, particularly the increase in CNS monthly churn to 1.2%, was disappointing with the loss in accounts been driven by SME enterprise customers. One possible reason for the lack of focus was the temporary absence of the CEO due to a heart issue earlier in the year. As the chart below shows, LVLT does have form with revenue dips after initial successful M&A integration. Many, including me, thought that the current management was more on top of the issue this time around.

click to enlargeLevel3 Operating History 2005 to 2017e

Despite this disappointment, the revenue impact is likely to more contained this time around and I believe the case for LVLT in the longer term remains strong. I have reduced my revenue estimates in the graph above but the free cashflow that LVLT’s business is throwing off makes the bull case. My PV cash-flow analysis still has a price target of over $65, which represents a 2018 EV/EBITDA multiple of slightly below 10. Although the multiple is high compared to the incumbent US telcom giants, I think it is warranted given the quality of LVLT’s assets in an ever data hungry economy. The current favourable, albeit political, regulatory trends (net neutrality and the ban on lock-up agreements) are another plus factor.

I estimate that the FCF generated by LVLT could, in the absence of any M&A, mean the firm could afford $1 billion of buybacks in 2017, rising by $250 million a year thereafter. An aggressive buyback programme over a five year period, 2017 to 2021, could amount to approx $7.5 billion or approx 30% of current share count at an average price of $65.

In terms of M&A, management are obviously keen although they did emphasis the need for discipline. An interesting response to an analyst question on the Q2 call that any potential M&A fiber targets for LVLT trade at higher EV/EBITDA multiples was as follows:

“So as we look at M&A, and you mentioned fiber companies, we look at fiber companies post-synergies and believe that we are very good at acquiring and capturing synergies and moving networks together, combining networks, and creating value for shareholders through that. So I don’t feel that the M&A environment is necessarily constrained.”

One of the firms that the analyst was possibly referring to is Zayo, who interestingly just hired LVLT’s long time CTO Jack Waters. Zayo currently trade at over 10 times its 2017 projected EBITDA compared to LVLT currently at a 2017 multiple in the low 9s. Obviously a premium would be needed in any M&A so the synergies would have to be meaningful (in Zayo’s case with a 50% plus EBITDA margin, the synergies would likely have to be mainly in the capex line). COLT telecom is another potential M&A target as Fidelity’s self imposed M&A embargo runs out after 2016 (see this post).

A significant attraction however is for LVLT itself to become a target. One of the US cable firms, most likely Comcast, is touted as a potential to beef up their enterprise offerings to compete with the incumbents. Other potential candidates include the ever data hungry technology firms such as Google or Microsoft who may wish to own significant fiber assets and reduce their dependence on telecoms such as Verizon who are increasingly looking like competitors.

As ever with LVLT, the ride is never boring, but hopefully not ever ending….