Category Archives: Economics

Remember deleveraging?

There is a lot of interesting stuff in the latest IMF Financial Stability Report. After much research on global debts levels (as per this post in 2014 and this one in 2015) over the past few years, the graph below on G20 gross debt levels from the IMF shows how little progress has been made.

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When looked at by advanced economy, the trend in gross debt from 2006 to 2016 looks startling, particularly for government debt.

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As the IMF state, “one lesson from the global financial crisis is that excessive debt that creates debt servicing problems can lead to financial strains” and “another lesson is that gross liabilities matter”.

The question does arise as to the economic impact of these debt levels if interest rates start to rise across advanced economies?

10 x Hopelessly Lax = ?

The economist Sir John Vickers, himself an ex Bank of England Chief Economist, recently had a pop at the current Bank of England’s governor and chair of the Financial Stability Board, Mark Carney.  He countered Carney’s assertion that “the largest banks are required to have as much as ten times more of the highest quality capital than before the crisis” with the quip that “ten times better than hopelessly lax is not a useful measure”. I particularly liked Vickers observation that equity capital is “a residual, the difference between two typically big numbers, of which the asset side is hard to measure given the nature of banking, and dependent on accounting rules”.

In a recent article in the FT, Martin Wolf joined in the Carney bashing by saying the ten times metric “is true only if one relies on the alchemy of risk-weighting” and that banking regulatory requirements have merely “gone from the insane to the merely ridiculous” since the crisis. Wolf acknowledges that “banks are in better shape, on many fronts, than they were a decade ago” but concludes that “their balance sheets are still not built to survive a big storm”.

I looked through a few of the bigger banks’ reports (randomly selected) across Europe and the US to see what their current risk weighted assets (RWA) as a percentage of total assets and their tier 1 common equity (CET1) ratios looked like, as below. The wide range of RWAs to total assets, indicative of the differing business focus for each bank, contrasts against the relatively similar level of core “equity” buffers.

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Wolf and Vickers both argue that higher capital levels, such as those cited by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig in The Bankers’ New Clothes, or more radical structural reform, such as that proposed by Mervyn King (see this post), should remain a goal for current policymakers like Carney.

The latest IMF Stability Report, published yesterday, has an interesting exhibit showing an adjusted capital ratio (which includes reserves against expected losses) for the global systemically important banks (GSIBs), as below.

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This exhibit confirms an increased capital resilience for the big banks. Hardly the multiple increases in safety that Mr Carney’s statements imply however.

Productivity Therapy

The IMF has sponsored another paper from staffers on the global productivity slowdown, with the catchy title “Gone with the Headwinds”. The paper reiterates many of the arguments concerning advanced economies referenced in this post, such as total factor productivity (TFP) hysteresis due to the boom-bust financial cycle and resulting capital misallocation, “an adverse feedback loop of weak aggregate demand, investment, and capital-embodied technological change”, elevated economic and policy uncertainty.

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Also cited are structural headwinds including a waning information and communication technology (ICT) boom, an aging workforce, slower human capital accumulation, and slowing global trade integration (including the maturing of China’s integration into world trade). An exhibit on the ICT trends from the report is reproduced below.

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The report highlights short term remedies such as boosting private sector demand, efficient spending on infrastructure, strengthening balance sheets, and reducing economic policy uncertainty. Longer term remedies cited include policies to boost technological progress, policies to mitigate the effects of aging, policies to encourage migration, advancing an open global trade system, exploiting policy synergies, structural reforms, raising the quantity and quality of human capital.

Now, how many of these remedies are likely to be pursued in the current populist political environment? Although Trump has shown signs recently of doing the opposite to what he fought the election on, overall it does look like we are merrily going down a policy dead-end for the next few years in important advanced economies. Hopefully the policy dead-end will be principally confined to the US and they wouldn’t take too long in figuring out the silliness of the current journey and the need to get back to trying to deal with the big issues intelligently. Then again….

Crimping CDS

The post-crisis CDS market has undergone significant regulatory change including a substantial regulatory overhaul due to the Volcker Rule, requirements from reporting to central clearing under the Dodd–Frank Act and the European Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), and Basel III capital and liquidity regulations. Measuring the size of the market consistently is notorious difficult given different accounting treatments, netting protocols, collateral requirements, and legal enforceability standards. Many organisations have been publishing data on the market (my source is the BIS for this post) but consistency has been an issue. Although a deeply flawed metric (due to some of the reasons just highlighted and then some), the graph below on the nominal size of the CDS market (which updates this post) illustrates the point on recent trends.

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The gross market value (defined by BIS as the sum of the absolute values of all open contracts with either positive or negative replacement values) and the net market value (which includes counterparty netting) are better metrics and indicate the real CDS exposure is a small fraction of the nominal market size, as per the graph below.

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Critics of the regulatory impact on the liquidity of the CDS market argue that these instruments are a vital tool in the credit markets for hedging positions, allowing investors to efficiently express investment positions and facilitating price discovery. A major issue for liquidity in the market is the capital constraints imposed by regulators which impedes the ability of financial institutions to engage in market-making. The withdrawal of Deutsche Bank from the CDS market was seen as a major blow despite some asset managers and hedge funds stepping up to the mark.

The impact of rising interest rates in the coming years on the credit markets will likely have some interesting, and potentially unforeseen, consequences. With a plethora of Goldman Sachs alumni currently working on Trump’s “very major hair cut on Dodd-Frank”, amongst other regulations, it will be interesting to see if any amendments lead to a shot in the arm for the CDS market. Jamie Dimon, in his most recent shareholder letter, calls for an approach by Trumps’ lieutenants “to open up the rulebook in the light of day and rework the rules and regulations that don’t work well or are unnecessary”.

Age of Change

As if we all needed proof that the people across the so called developed world are troubled about the future, the election of Donald Trump to the US presidency last Tuesday is still a shock and unfolded in a spookingly familiar manner to the Brexit vote. “Wrong!” as Alec Baldwin has so aptly mimicked could be the call to the pollsters and commentators who are now scratching around despondently for reasons.

Why, we again ask, could an electorate so recklessly vote against conventional wisdom. I think the answer is in the question. Although the factors behind Trump’s vote are multi-faceted and reflect a bizarre coalition that will be impossible to satisfy, the over-riding factor has to lie at the door of an electorate that is troubled by future prospects and rejects the status quo. Why else would they vote for a man that polls suggests a majority acknowledge as been unqualified for the job? Aspects such as the worry of aging baby boomers at the diminishing returns on savings, the insecurity of the middle and working classes over globalisation, and the realisation that the technology from the shared economy is a cover for unsecure low wage employment have all contributed. Like in the Brexit vote, Trump tapped into a nostalgia for times past as an easy answer to the complex questions facing the world we live in.

The age profile of the Brexiteers in the UK and Trump voters in the US is interesting in that it highlights that Trump’s surprise victory is slightly less of a factor of age than Brexit.

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Aging demographics in the developed world has been highlighted by many as a contributor to the current low growth. I last posted on this topic before here and the graph below is a reminder of one of the current predictions by the UN.

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The impacts of aging on future dependency ratios can be seen below, again from UN predictions.

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A fascinating report from the research department of the FED last month, entitled “Understanding the New Normal: The Role of Demographics”, argues that demographic factors alone in the US account for 1.25% decline in the nature rate of interest and real GDP growth since 1980. The report concludes that “looking forward, the model suggests that low interest rates, low output growth, and low investment rates are here to stay, suggesting that the U.S. economy has entered a new normal”.

There was an interesting article recently in the FT called “The effects of aging” which included the graph below from UBS which strikingly highlights the changes in demographic trends and financial crises.

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Whatever disparate concoction of economic policies that Trump will follow in an attempt to tap the ghost of Reaganomics, it is clear that lower taxes and increased US debt will be feature. Trump may surprise everyone and use debt wisely to increase productivity on items such as rebuilding infrastructure, although it’s more likely to go on wasteful expenditure to satisfy his motley crew of constituents (eh hello, a Mexico wall!).

I constructed an index to show the relative level of debt dependency of countries using the 2020 debt level predicted by the IMF and the average 2020 to 2050 dependency ratios by the UN. Both the US and the UK are above the average based upon current forecasts and really can’t afford any debt laden policy cul-de-sacs. One only has to look at Japan for enlightenment in that direction. We have to hope that policies pursued by politicians in the US and the UK in their attempt to bring back the past over the next few years don’t result in unsustainable debt levels. Maybe inflation, some are calling the outcome of Trump’s likely policies trumpflation, will inflate debts away!

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In his recent book, “A banquet of consequences”, Satyajit Das articulated the choice we have in terms of a choice of two bad options by using the metaphor of the ancient  mythical sea monsters, Scylla and Charybdis, who terrorised sailors. Das said “Today, the world is trapped between Scylla, existing policies that promise stagnation and slow decline, and Charybdis, decisive action that leads to an immediate loss in living standards.

The character of Charybdis is said to be the personification of a whirlwind. Remind you of anyone….?