Tag Archives: book value multiples

Pricing Pressures & Risk Profiles

There have been some interesting developments in the insurance market this week. Today, it was announced that Richard Brindle would retire from Lancashire at the end of the month. The news is not altogether unexpected as Brindle was never a CEO with his ego caught up in the business. His take it or leave it approach to underwriting and disciplined capital management are engrained in Lancashire’s DNA and given the less important role of personalities in the market today, I don’t see the sell-off of 5% today as justified. LRE is now back at Q3 2011 levels and is 25% off its peak approximately a year ago. As per a previous post, the smaller players in the specialty business face considerable challenges in this market although LRE should be better placed than most. A recent report from Willis on the energy market illustrates how over-capacity is spreading across specialist lines. Some graphs from the report are reproduced below.

click to enlargeEnergy Insurance Market Willis 2013 Review

One market character who hasn’t previously had an ego check issue is John Charman and this week he revealed a hostile take-over of Aspen at a 116% of book value by his new firm Endurance Specialty. The bid was quickly rejected by Aspen with some disparaging comments about Endurance and Charman. Aspen’s management undoubtedly does not relish the prospect of having Charman as a boss. Consolidation is needed amongst the tier 2 (mainly Bermudian) players to counter over-capacity and compete in a market that is clustering around tier 1 global full service players. Although each of the tier 2 players has a different focus, there is considerable overlap in business lines like reinsurance so M&A will not be a case of one and one equalling two. To be fair to Charman the price looks reasonable at a 15% premium to Aspen’s high, particularly given the current market. It will be fascinating to see if any other bidders emerge.

After going ex-dividend, Swiss Re also took a dive of 9% this week and it too is at levels last seen a year ago. The dive was unusually deep due to the CHF7 dividend (CHF3.85 regular and CHF4.15 special). Swiss Re’s increasingly shareholder friendly policy makes it potentially attractive at its current 112% of book value. It is however not immune from the current market pricing pressures.

After doing some work recently on the impact of reducing premium rates, I built a very simple model of a portfolio of 10,000 homogeneous risks with a loss probability of 1%. Assuming perfect burning cost rating (i.e. base rate set at actual portfolio mean), the model varied the risk margin charged. I ran the portfolio through 10,000 simulations to get the resulting distributions. As the graph below shows, a decreasing risk margin not only shifts the distribution but also changes the shape of the distribution.

click to enlargeRisk Premium Reductions & Insurance Portfolio Risk Profile

This illustrates that as premium rates decline the volatility of the portfolio also increases as there is less of a buffer to counter variability. In essence, as the market continues to soften, even with no change in loss profile, the overall portfolio risk increases. And that is why I remain cautious on buying back into the sector even with the reduced valuations of firms like Lancashire and Swiss Re.

Trick or treat: AIG Q3 Follow Up

Well, I’d put AIG’s Q3 results firmly in the trick basket. The big surprise for me was the nearly $1 billion income tax benefit item in Q3. I wasn’t expecting that.

Income before tax was distinctly lacklustre. The P&C technical result was only marginally worse whilst P&C investment income added just over $1 billion of incremental income before tax. Life & retirement only added $400 million of incremental delivered income before tax. The hodgepodge of the other segment had a negative impact of over $1 billion of incremental income before tax due to the marginal increases in GCM and DIB lagging interest, corporate & legal expenses. Updated graphs for net income and the other segment for YTD to Q3 are below.

click to enlargeAIG Net Income Breakdown Q3 2013click to enlargeAIG Other Segment Q3 2013

Overall then, I wouldn’t materially change my estimates for a “normal” 2014 (although I may need to reconsider my tax assumptions) and would stick to a book value target of $70 by year end 2014 as being achievable, save any large catastrophes or unexploded bombs. One small treat from the results was the reduction in share count which should continue.

Although the risk/reward is getting more attractive after the price drop to just above $48, I will stay on the side-line as the overall market looks very frothy to me and, as a result, I am currently in risk reduction mode. The uncertainty around the other segment and the lack of clear improvement in the P&C segment may justify the AIG book multiple discount for a while yet.

Factors impacting AIG’s valuation

AIG stock has been the subject of much investor attention in recent times and has doubled over the past 24 months. The new AIG has become a hedge fund favourite, the 3rd most popular stock according to Goldman Sachs. I did briefly look over AIG at the end of 2010 when it traded around $35 but concluded there was too much uncertainty around its restructuring and I particularly didn’t like the P&C reserve deteriorations in 2009 and 2010. The stock fell below $25 in 2011 before reversing and beginning its recent accent above $45 as further clarity on its business performance emerged. I figured now is a good time to give the new AIG another look.

Unless you have been living on Mars, everybody is aware that AIG has had a very colourful history and, although it’s past is not the focus of this post, the graph below of the 10 year history of the stock is a reminder of the grim fate suffered by its equity holders with the current price still only about 5% of the pre-crash average. For what it is worth, the 2005 Fortune article “All I want in life is an unfair advantage” and the 2009 Vanity Fair article “The Man Who Crashed the World” by Michael Lewis are two of my favourites on the subject and worth a read.

click to enlargeAIG 10 year stock price

To understand the new AIG we need to review the current balance sheet and the breakdown of the sources of net income since 2010. The balance sheet (excluding segregated assets & liabilities) as at Q2 2013 is represented in the exhibit below.

click to enlargeAIG Balance Sheet & Assets

AIG’s liquid assets look reasonably diverse and creditworthy although these assets should really be looked at in their respective business units. The P&C assets are the more conservative and look in line with their peers. The life and retirement assets are riskier and reflect the underling product mix and risk profile of that business.

Another item to note is the $31.2 billion of aircraft leasing assets from ILFC against the $26.5 billion of liabilities representing $4.7 billion of net assets. AIG’s deal to sell 80% of ILFC to a Chinese consortium for book value looks like it may fall apart. If it does, the possibility of going down the IPO route is now a realistic option, absent a change in current market conditions.

The next item to note is the other assets representing 13% of total assets. These are primarily made up of $20 billion of deferred taxes, $9 billion of DAC, $14 billion of premium receivables, and $15 billion of various assets. This last item includes $2.8 billion of fair value derivative assets which correspond to $3.1 billion of fair value derivative liabilities. The notional value of these assets and liabilities is approximately $90 billion and $110 billion respectively from primarily interest rate contracts but also FX, equity, commodity and credit derivatives that are not designated for hedging purposes. The majority (about 2/3rd) of these are from the Global Capital Markets division which includes the run-off of the infamous AIG Financial Products (AIGFP) unit.

AIG’s non-life reserves, at $108 billion, have been a source of volatility in the past with significant strengthening required in 2002, 2004, 2005, 2009 and 2010. The life and retirement reserves are split $121 billion of policyholder contracts (including guaranteed variable annuity products like GMWB), $5 billion of other policyholder funds, and $40 billion of mortality and morbidity reserves.

A breakdown of AIG’s net income since 2010 shows the sources of profit and losses as per the graph below.

click to enlargeAIG Net Income Breakdown 2010 to Q22013

The graph shows that the impact of discontinued operations has been playing less of a part in the net income line. It also points to the need to understand the importance of the other business category in 2011 and 2012 as well as the relative underperformance in the P&C division in contributing to net income for 2010 to 2012.

In 2011, contributors to other pre-tax income included a $1.7 billion impairment charge on ILFC’s fleet and a net $2.9 billion charge due to the termination of the New York Fed credit facility. 2012 net income included a $0.8 billion gain on the sale of AIA shares and an increase of $2.9 billion in the fair value of AIG’s interest in Maiden Lane III (the vehicle created during the AIG bailout for AIGFP’s CDO credit default swap portfolio). These 2012 gains were partially offset by an increase of $0.8 billion in litigation reserves.

AIG bulls point to the 2013 YTD performance. Improved operating margins in the core P&C and life/retirement units have combined with income from the other activities (mortgage business, Global Capital Markets & Direct Investment portfolios) covering corporate and interest expenses and any other one off charges (such as those in the paragraph above). This performance has led analysts to predict 2013 EPS around $4.20 and 2014 EPS of $4.30 to $4.50.

AIG has traded at a significant discount to its peers on a book value basis as a result of its troubled past and currently trades at 0.73. The graphs below uses recently published book values and book value excluding Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI) which have been the subject to adjustment and reinstatement and may not therefore reflect the book values published at the time.

click to enlargeAIG stock price to book values 2009 to August 2013

AIG Book Value Multiples 2009 to August 2013

In summary, the factors impacting the current AIG valuation are the significant book value discount as a result of AIG’s history, the uncertainty around the ILFC sale, the future prospects of the core P&C and life/retirement units, and the historical volatility in the other operating business lines (and the potential for future volatility!). Each of these items need to be understood further before any conclusions can be reached on whether AIG is currently undervalued or overvalued. In a follow-on post on AIG I will try to dig deeper into each of these factors and also offer my thoughts on future performance and valuation of the new AIG.

Historical Price to Tangible Book Value for Reinsurers and Wholesale Insurers

Following on from the previous post, the graph below shows the historical P/TBV ratios for selected reinsurers and wholesale insurers with a portfolio including material books of reinsurance (company names as per previous post). The trend shows the recent uptick in valuations highlighted in the previous post. The graph is also consistent with the Guy Carpenter price to book value graph widely used in industry presentations.

Historical P to TBV Reinsurers & Wholesale Insurers 2001 to 2013Over the past 12 months the sector has broken out of the downward trend across the financial services sector following the financial crisis, most notably in the banking sector as the graph below from TT International illustrates.

TT International Bank Price to Book Ratio

Tangible book value growth across the wholesale insurance sector was approximately 10% from YE2011 to YE2012 and the weighted average operating ROE of 11% in 2012 has been rewarded with higher multiples.

The sector faces a number of significant issues and a return to valuations prior to the financial crisis remains unrealistic. An increase in capacity from non-traditional sources and the increased loss costs from catastrophes are cited in industry outlooks as headwinds although I tend to agree with EIOPA’s recently published risk dashboard in highlighting the impact of macro-economic risks on insurer’s balance sheets as the major headwind.

One issue that deserves further attention in this regard is the impact low interest rates have had on boasting unrealised gains and the resulting impact on the growth in book values. Swiss Re is one of the few companies to explicitly highlight the role of unrealised gains in its annual report, making up approximately 13% of its equity. In a presentation in September 2012, the company had an interesting slide on the impact of unrealised gains on the sector’s capital levels, reproduced below.

Reinsurer Capital & Unrealised Gains

P/TBV is one of my favoured metrics for looking at insurance valuations. But no one metric should be looked at in isolation. The impact of any sudden unwinding of unrealised gains if the macro environment turns nasty is just one of the issues facing the sector which deserves a deeper analysis.

Market valuations of wholesale insurers and reinsurers shift upwards

With many of the Bermudian, European and US wholesale insurers hitting 52 week highs last week, there is a definite shift in sentiment about the sector. It remains to be seen whether the shift is simply part of the overall market rally or a more structural shift in the markets view of the previously historic low tangible book multiples. A wide sample of firms in the reinsurance and wholesale insurance sectors are included in the graph below.

Wholesale Insurer & Reinsurer Valuations