Tag Archives: probable maximum loss

A Tale of Two Insurers

My negativity on the operating prospects for the reinsurance and specialty insurance sector has been articulated many times previously in this blog. Many of the same factors are impacting the broader commercial insurance market. Pricing conditions in the US and globally can be seen in the graph below.

click to enlargeUS and Global Commercial Insurance Pricing

Two insurers, at different ends of the size scale, which I have previously posted on, are AIG (more recently here and here) and Lancashire (more recently here and here). Given that a lot has happened to each since I last posted on them, I thought a quick update on both would give an interesting insight into the current market.

First up is AIG who have been under a lot of pressure from shareholders to unlock value, including a break-up plan for the insurance giant from the opportunistic rascal Carl Icahn. The graph below shows a breakdown of recent operating results (as ever with AIG longer term comparisons are hampered by their ever changing reporting segments). The improvement in the UGC mortgage insurance business has been dwarfed by the poor non-life results which were impacted by a significant reserve strengthening charge.

click to enlargeAIG PreTax Operating Income 2012 to 2015

In January, Peter Hancock (the 5th CEO since Hank Greenberg left in 2005) announced a new strategic plan to the end of 2017, the main points of which are

  • Return at least $25 billion of capital to shareholders through dividends and share buy-backs from operating profits, divestitures and other actions such as monetizing future life profits by $4-5 billion through reinsurance purchases.
  • Enhance transparency by separating into an operating portfolio with a goal of over 10% return on equity and a legacy portfolio that will focus on return of capital. Reorganize into at least nine modular, more self-contained business units to enhance accountability, transparency, and strategic flexibility.
  • Reduce general operating expenses by $1.6 billion, 14 percent of the 2015 expenses.
  • Improve the commercial P&C accident year loss ratio by six points.
  • Pursue an active divestiture program, including initially the 20% IPO of UGC.

The non-life reserve charge in 2015 amounted to $3.6 billion. 60% of the charge came from the (mainly US) casualty business, 16% from financial lines (again mainly in the US) and 15% from the run-off business. After the last material reserve strengthening in 2010, the worrying aspect of the 2015 charge is that approximately two thirds comes from accident years not yet 10 years old (which is relatively immature for long tail casualty business particularly when 42% of the charge is on excess casualty business). The impact of the reserve hikes on the commercial P&C segment can be clearly seen in the graph below.

click to enlargeAIG Commercial P&C Combined Ratio Breakdown 2008 to 2015

Perhaps the most aggressive target, given current market conditions, in the strategic plan is the 6% improvement in the commercial P&C accident year loss ratio by the end of 2017. The plan includes exiting approximately $1 billion of US casualty business, including poorly performing excess casualty business, primary and excess auto liability, health-care and financial lines business. Growth of $0.5 billion is been targeted in multi-national, financial lines, property upper middle market and major accounts which involve specialist engineering capabilities, international casualty and emerging risks such as cyber and M&A insurance. AIG also recently announced a two year reinsurance deal with Swiss Re on their US casualty book (it looks like a 25% quota share). The scale of the task for AIG in meeting this target can be seen in the exhibit below which takes a number of slides from the strategy presentation.

click to enlargeAIG Commercial P&C Metrics

I was struck by a quote from the firm on their turnaround plan – “We will use the data and analytical tools we have invested in to significantly differentiate and determine where we should focus our resources.” I suspect that every significant insurer would claim to have, or at least aspire to have, similar analytical capabilities. Big data and analytical driven underwriting is undoubtedly the future for large insurers with access to large amounts of quality data. Fortune had an interesting recent article on the analytical firm Palantir who are working with some insurers on sharpening their underwriting criteria for the social media age. An analyst in Citi even suggested that Goggle should look at buying AIG as a fintech play. The entry of the big internet firms into the insurance sector seems inevitable in some form or other, although I doubt AIG will be part of any such strategy.

As to the benefits of staying a large composite insurer, AIG cited an analysis commissioned by consultants Oliver Wyman supporting the benefits of diversification between the life and non-life business of AIG. Using the S&P consolidated model as a proxy, Oliver Wyman estimate a $7.5 billion capital benefit to AIG compared to separate life and non-life businesses, as envisaged in Icahn’s plan.

So, can AIG achieve the aggressive operational targets they have set themselves for the P&C business? Current market conditions present a considerable challenge. Combined with their recent results, an end of 2017 target for a 6% improvement is extremely aggressive. Too aggressive for my liking. However, the P&C results should improve somewhat over the short term (particularly if there is no more big reserve charges) and actions such as expense reductions, monetizing future life profits and divestitures will give AIG the fire power to hand out sweeties to shareholders. For those willing to take the punt, the return of a chunk of the $25 billion target in dividends and share buy-backs over the next 2 years for a firm with a current market value of $61 billion, trading at a 0.72 multiple to book value (trading around 0.92 of book less AOCI and DTA), may be too tempting to resist. It does have a certain allure…..

Lancashire, a London market specialty insurer and reinsurer with a mantra of disciplined underwriting, is at the opposite end of the scale spectrum with a niche focus. Long cherished by investors for its shareholder friendly dividend policies, Lancashire has been under pressure of late due to the heavy competition in its niche markets. The energy insurance sector, for example, has been described by the broker Willis as dismal with capacity chasing a smaller premium pool due to the turmoil in the oil market. A number of recent articles (such as here and here) highlight the dangers. Alex Maloney, the firm’s CEO, described the current market as “one of the most difficult trading environments during the last twenty years”. In addition, Lancashire lost its founder, Richard Brindle, in 2014 plus the CEO, the CFO and some senior underwriters of its Lloyds’ Cathedral unit in 2015.

The graph below shows the breakdown of reported historical calendar year combined ratios plus the latest accident year net loss ratio and paid ratio.

click to enlargeLancashire Ratio Breakdown 2008 to 2015

The underwriting discipline that Lancashire professes can be seen in the recent accident year loss ratios and in the 30% drop in gross written premiums (GWP), as per the graph below. The drop is more marked in net written premiums at 35% due to the increase in reinsurance spend to 25% of GWP (from approx 10% in its early years).

click to enlargeLancashire GWP Breakdown 2008 to 2015

The timely and astute increase in reinsurance protection spend can be seen in the decrease in their peak US aggregate exposures. The latest probable maximum loss (PML) estimates for their US peak exposures are approximately $200 million compared to historical levels of $300-350 million. Given the lower net premium base, the PML figures in loss ratio terms have only dropped to 40% from 50-60% historically. Lancashire summed up their reinsurance purchasing strategy as follows:

“Our outwards reinsurance programme provides a breadth and depth of cover which has helped us to strengthen our position and manage volatility. This helps us to continue to underwrite our core portfolio through the challenges posed by the cycle.”

As with AIG, the temptation for shareholders is that Lancashire will continue with their generous dividends, as the exhibit below from their Q4 2015 presentation shows.

click to enlargeLancashire Dividend History 2015

The other attraction of Lancashire is that it may become a take-over target. It currently trades at 1.4 times tangible book level which is rich compared to its US and Bermudian competitors but low compared to its peers in Lloyds’ which trade between 1.58 and 2.0 times tangible book. Lancashire itself included the exhibit below on tangible book values in its Q4 2015 presentation.

click to enlargeInsurance Tangible Book Value Multiple 2012 to 2015

It is noteworthy that there has been little activity on the insurance M&A front since the eye boggling multiples achieved by Amlin and HCC from their diversification hungry Japanese purchasers. Many in the market thought the valuations signaled the top of the M&A frenzy.

Relatively, AIG looks more attractive than Lancashire in terms of the potential for shareholder returns. However, fundamentally I cannot get away from current market conditions. Risk premia is just too low in this sector and no amount of tempting upside through dividends, buy-backs or M&A multiples can get me comfortable with the downside potential that comes with this market. As per the sentiment expressed in previous posts, I am happy with zero investment exposure to the insurance sector right now. I will watch this one play out from the sidelines.

Cyber Insurance Catastrophe Scenario

The UK government and Marsh released an interesting report today on cyber risk and insurance. Most cyber insurance is written on a standalone basis or as an add-on to professional indemnity, D&O, general liability or business interruption and property covers. Policy wording and terms and conditions vary widely. One of the current uncertainties is what will happen when a major attack, or more likely a frequency of industry wide cyber attacks, occurs and how traditional insurance exclusions will hold up in the case of legal challenge. The recent 2014 ruling on the Sony Playstation’s 2011 data breach provided the insurance industry comfort that they will stand up but nothing is certain when new types of losses unforeseen by existing policy wordings meet the US legal system.

The report relieves some interesting facts on the market such as the quantum and variability of current pricing for cyber insurance, as the paragraph and graphic below show.

“There are several factors that influence the price of different insurance products. In the case of cyber insurance, the price may also be driven by uncertainty over the risk compared to more traditional covers. This seems to be the case, with much flatter pricing for cyber across firms than for other lines of insurance; the difference between third and first quartile pricing is 1.7x for cyber, 9.1x for general liability, and 2.6x for property. The combination of a higher absolute price and lower price differentiation suggests that cyber is early in its development and that underwriters are more conservative about the risk, creating a challenge to a core role of insurance – namely, that high pricing discourages take up, and flat pricing provides no incentive for firms to reduce their cyber risk and save on premiums.”

click to enlarge2014 Cyber Insurance Market Pricing

On the topic of a probable maximum loss (PML) for the insurance sector, the report uses a fairly unscientific 20% of the estimated 2014 aggregate limit of £100 billion, based upon industry expert judgment, as a guesstimate.

click to enlargeCyber Catastrophe Scenario

Given the need for insurers to diversify their product offerings in this soft specialty insurance market, future demand for cyber insurance products (the report says the cyber insurance market will grow threefold over the next 3 to 5 years) will mean that more accurate estimates for risk accumulations need to be developed.

At this stage in the product cycle for cyber insurance, most insurers can likely rely on their friendly and premium hungry reinsurer to take the aggregation risk from their cyber exposures (estimated by the report to be £20 billion). Given the capital markets risk appetite for low yields and insurance risks, it would not surprise me if some investment bank is currently busily working away on the first cyber bond!

Lancashire finds the love

After going ex-dividend in November, investors went mega bearish on Lancashire (LRE.L) when it nearly dropped below the 500p level, as the graph below shows. A previous post highlighted the reasons behind the change in sentiment over the first half of 2014 on the once darling of the specialty insurance sector.

click to enlargeLancashire Insurance Group 2014 Share Price

The firm released its Q4 today and announced another special dividend of $0.50 on top of the regular $0.10 dividend. Driven by stable results, as per the graph below, and by the chatter that Lancashire could be an M&A target, the price today reflects a respectable 160% multiple to diluted tangible book. It was odd that although the firm’s executives joked about having prepared an answer to the M&A question, no analyst actually asked the question in the conference call today!

click to enlargeLancashire Historical Combined Loss 2008 to 2014

One of the big positives from the call today was the news that the firm has restructured their reinsurance programme that protects their book to give them more event coverage with reinstatements (away from previous aggregate cover). This provides more protection to Lancashire from multiple events. The PMLs as at January expressed as a percentage of the calendar year earned premiums (estimated figures for 2015) show the reduced net risk profile of this arbitrage strategy.

click to enlargeLancashire PMLs January 2015

It’s nice to see Lancashire recover some of its shine and it will be intriguing to see if it does become an M&A target in the coming months.

Lancashire is looking unloved

With exposure adjusted rates in the specialty insurance and reinsurance sector continually under pressure and founder/former CEO, Richard Brindle, making an unseemly quick exit with a generous pay-out, Lancashire’s stock has been decidedly unloved with the price trading well below the key £7 threshold highlighted in my last post on the subject in February. Although we remain in the middle of the US hurricane season (and indeed the Napa earthquake is a reminder that its always earthquake season), I thought it was a good time to have a quick look over Lancashire’s figures again, particularly as the share price broke below the £6 threshold earlier this month, a level not seen since early 2011. The stock has clearly now lost its premium valuation compared to others in the London market as the graph below shows.

click to enlargeLondon Market Specialty Insurers Tangible Book Value Multiples August 2014

Results for H1-2014, which include full numbers from the November 2013 acquisition of Cathedral, show a continuing trend on the impact of rate reductions on loss ratios, as per the graph below.

click to enlargeLancashire Historical Combined Loss 2006 to H12014

The impact of the Cathedral deal on reserve levels are highlighted below. The graph illustrates the consistent relative level of IBNR to case reserves compared to the recent past which suggests a limited potential for any cushion for loss ratios from prior year reserve releases.

click to enlargeLancashire Historical Net Loss Reserves

The management at Lancashire have clearly stated their strategy of maintaining their discipline whilst taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities “that allow us to maintain our core insurance and reinsurance portfolios, whilst significantly reducing net exposures and enhancing risk adjusted returns”. In my last post, I looked at post Cathedral gross and net PMLs as a percentage of earned premiums against historical PMLs. More applicable figures as per July for each year, against calendar year gross and net earned premiums (with an estimate for 2014), are presented below. They clearly show that the net exposures have reduced from the 2012 peak. It is important to note however that the Gulf of Mexico net 1 in 100 figures are high at 35%, particularly compared to many of its peers.

click to enlargeLancashire PMLs July 2010 to July 2014

There is of course always the allure of the special dividend. Lancashire has indicated that in the absence of attractive business opportunities they will look at returning most, if not all, of their 2014 earnings to shareholders. Assuming the remainder of 2014 is relatively catastrophe free; Lancashire is on track to make $1-$1.10 of EPS for the full year. If they do return, say, $1 to shareholders that represents a return of just below 10% on today’s share price of £6.18. Not bad in today’s environment! There may be a short term trade there in October after the hurricane season to take advantage of a share pick-up in advance of any special dividend.

Others in the sector are also holding out the prospect of special dividends to reward patient shareholders. The fact that other firms, some with more diverse businesses and less risky risk profiles, offer potential upside through special dividends may also explain why Lancashire has lost its premium tangible book multiple, as per the first graph in this post.

Notwithstanding that previously Lancashire was a favorite of mine due to its nimble and focused approach, I cannot get past the fact that the sector as a whole is mired in an inadequate risk adjusted premia environment (the impact of which I highlighted in a previous post). In the absence of any sector wide catalyst to change the current market dynamic, my opinion is that it is expedient to pass on Lancashire here, even at this multi-year low.

The game of chicken that is unfolding across this sector is best viewed from the side-lines in my view.