Tag Archives: Lancashire valuation

Hot Take-outs

In many episodes of fervent investment activity within a particular hot spot, like the current insurance M&A party, there is a point where you think “really?”. The deal by Mitsui Sumitomo to take over Amlin at 2.4 times tangible book is one such moment. A takeover of Amlin was predicted by analysts, as per this post, so that’s no surprise but the price is.

With the usual caveat on the need to be careful when comparing multiples for US, Bermuda, London and European insurers given the different accounting standards, the graph below from a December post, shows the historical tangible book value levels and the improving multiples being applied by the market to London firms such as Amlin.

click to enlargeHistorical Tangible Book Multiples for Reinsurers & Specialty Insurers

Comparable multiples from recent deals, as per the graph below, show the high multiple of the Mitsui/Amlin deal. Amlin has a 10 year average ROE around 20% but a more realistic measure is the recent 5 year average of 11%. In today’s market, the short to medium term ROE expectation is likely to be in the high single digits. Even at 10%, the 2.4 multiple looks aggressive.

click to enlargeM&A Tangible Book Multiples September 2015

There is little doubt that the insurance M&A party will continue and that the multiples may be racy. In the London market, the remaining independent players are getting valued as such, as per the graph below tracking valuations at points in time.

click to enlargeLondon Specialty Insurers Tangible Book Values

When the hangover comes, a 2.4 multiple will look even sillier than its does now at this point in the pricing cycle. In the meantime, its party like 1999 time!

Insurers keep on swinging

In a previous post, I compared the M&A action in the reinsurance and specialty insurance space to a rush for the bowl of keys in a swingers party. Well, the ACE/Chubb deal has brought the party to a new level where anything seems possible. The only rule now seems to be a size restriction to avoid a G-SIFI label (although MetLife and certain US stakeholders are fighting to water down those proposals for insurers).

I expanded the number of insurers in my pool for an update of the tangible book multiples (see previous post from December) as per the graphic below. As always, these figures come with a health warning in that care needs to be taken when comparing US, European and UK firms due to the differing accounting treatment (for example I have kept the present value of future profits as a tangible item). I estimated the 2015 ROE based upon Q1 results and my view of the current market for the 2011 to 2015 average.

click to enlargeReinsurers & Specialty Insurers NTA Multiples July 2015

I am not knowledgeable enough to speculate on who may be the most likely next couplings (for what its worth, regular readers will know I think Lancashire will be a target at some stage). This article outlines who Eamonn Flanagan at Shore Capital thinks is next, with Amlin being his top pick. What is clear is that the valuation of many players is primarily based upon their M&A potential rather than the underlying operating results given pricing in the market. Reinsurance pricing seems to have stabilised although I suspect policy terms & conditions remains an area of concern. On the commercial insurance side, reports from market participants like Lockton (see here) and Towers Watson (see graph below) show an ever competitive market.

click to enlargeCommercial Lines Insurance Pricing Survey Towers Watson Q1 2015

Experience has thought me that pricing is the key to future results for insurers and, although the market is much more disciplined than the late 1990s, I think many will be lucky to produce double-digit ROEs in the near term on an accident year basis (beware those dipping too much into the reserve pot!).

I am also nervous about the amount of unrealised gains which are inflating book values that may reverse when interest rates rise. For example, unrealised gains make up 8%, 13% and 18% of the Hartford, Zurich, and Swiss Re’s book value respectively as at Q1. So investing primarily to pick up an M&A premium seems like a mugs game to me in the current market.

M&A obviously brings considerable execution risk which may result in one plus one not equalling two. Accepting that the financial crisis hit the big guys like AIG and Hartford pretty hard, the graph below suggests that being too big may not be beautiful where average ROE (and by extension, market valuation) is the metric for beauty.

click to enlargeIs big beautiful in insurance

In fact, the graph above suggests that the $15-$25 billion range in terms of premiums may be the sweet spot for ROE. Staying as a specialist in the $2-7 billion premium range may have worked in the past but, I suspect, will be harder to replicate in the future.

Lancashire finds the love

After going ex-dividend in November, investors went mega bearish on Lancashire (LRE.L) when it nearly dropped below the 500p level, as the graph below shows. A previous post highlighted the reasons behind the change in sentiment over the first half of 2014 on the once darling of the specialty insurance sector.

click to enlargeLancashire Insurance Group 2014 Share Price

The firm released its Q4 today and announced another special dividend of $0.50 on top of the regular $0.10 dividend. Driven by stable results, as per the graph below, and by the chatter that Lancashire could be an M&A target, the price today reflects a respectable 160% multiple to diluted tangible book. It was odd that although the firm’s executives joked about having prepared an answer to the M&A question, no analyst actually asked the question in the conference call today!

click to enlargeLancashire Historical Combined Loss 2008 to 2014

One of the big positives from the call today was the news that the firm has restructured their reinsurance programme that protects their book to give them more event coverage with reinstatements (away from previous aggregate cover). This provides more protection to Lancashire from multiple events. The PMLs as at January expressed as a percentage of the calendar year earned premiums (estimated figures for 2015) show the reduced net risk profile of this arbitrage strategy.

click to enlargeLancashire PMLs January 2015

It’s nice to see Lancashire recover some of its shine and it will be intriguing to see if it does become an M&A target in the coming months.

Updated Insurance Multiples

It has been a while since I looked at net tangible asset multiples for reinsurers and selected specialty insurers (the last such post is here). Motivated by the collapse in Lancashire’s multiple (briefly mentioned in a previous post) since they went ex-dividend, I redid the tangible book multiple figures. Previously I have used average operating ROEs as the x-axis but this time I have used annualized total returns since year-end 2010 (to capture the 2011 catastrophe year with the recent results of the past 3 years). Annualized total returns are made up of tangible book growth and dividends paid in 2011 to today. The split between tangible book growth and dividends, on an annualized basis across the past 4 years, for each firm as per the graph below (when calculating tangible book values, as is my usual practise disclosed previously, I excluded all goodwill and intangibles, except for the present value of future profits (PVFP) for life reinsurance business for European reinsurers).

click to enlargeReinsurers & Specialty Insurer Total Return December 2014

The graph of tangible book multiples to annualized returns is below. [Note – although insurance accounting has converged somewhat in recent years, caution still needs to be taken when comparing UK, European, and Bermudian/US firms due to the differing accounting regimes under which results are reported].

click to enlargeReinsurers & Specialty Insurers NTA Multiples December 2014

I split the firms into different colours – green is for the Bermudian & US firms, red is for London market firms, and blue is for the European composite reinsurers. In terms of who else may get involved in M&A following the Renaissance/Platinum deal, its interesting to see most of the Bermudians bunched up so close to each other in valuation and return profiles. The higher valued and larger firms may be the instigators in taking over smaller competitors but it looks more likely that medium sized firms need to get with today’s realities and seek tie-ups together. Who will wait it out in the hope of some market changing event or who will get it together in 2015 will be fascinating to watch!!

Follow-on: To get an idea of historical changes in the tangible book multiples in the three groupings above, the graph below shows the trends. The multiples in each year are simple averages across the firms (and not all are at the same point in the year) but the graph nonetheless gives an idea of changing market sentiment. Although the London and European firms are a smaller sample than the Bermudian/US firms, the graph indicates that the market is confident that the underwriting indiscipline of years past have been overcome in the London market, thus justifying a premium multiple. Time will tell on that score…..

click to enlargeHistorical Tangible Book Multiples for Reinsurers & Specialty Insurers

Mega-Tsunami Fright Scenario

There was a nice piece on the online FT on the forces impacting the reinsurance sector last night. Lancashire, which is behaving oddly these days, was one of the firms mentioned. Lancashire looks like its set to drop by approximately 12% (the amount of the special dividend) when it goes ex-dividend after today the 28th (although yahoo has been shown it dropping by 10%-12% at the end of trading for several days now, including yesterday). If it does drop to a £5.50 level, that’s approximately a 123% price to diluted tangible book value. Quite a come down from the loftier valuations of 150%-170% under previous CEO Richard Brindle!

Anyway, this post is not about that. A major part of modern risk management in the insurance sector today is applying real life scenarios to risk portfolios to assess their impact. Lloyds’ has being doing it for years with their realistic disaster scenarios (RDS). Insurers are adept at using scenarios generating by professional catastrophic models from firms like RMS and AIR on so-called peak zones like US hurricanes or Japan earthquake. Many non-peak scenarios are not explicitly modelled by such firms.

The horrors of the tsunamis from the 2011 Tōhoku and the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquakes have been brought home vividly in this multi-media age. The damage in human terms from the receding waters full of debris makes the realities of such events all too real.  Approximately 80% of tsunamis come from earthquakes and history is littered with examples of large destructive tsunami resulting from earthquakes – the 1755 Great Lisbon earthquake in Portugal, the 1783 Calabrian and the 1908 Messina earthquakes in Italy, the 1896 Sanriku earthquake in Japan, the recently discovered 365 AD Mediterranean quake, the 1700 Cascadia Megathrust earthquake in the west coast of the US, and the 1958 Lituya Bay quake in Alaska are but a few examples.

Volcanoes are another potential cause of mega tsunamis as many volcanoes are found next to the sea, notably in countries bordering the Pacific Ocean, the northern Mediterranean and the Caribbean Sea.  One scenario put forward by a paper from Steven Ward and Simon Day in 2001 is the possibility of a mega tsunami from a collapse of an unstable volcanic ridge caused by previous Cumbre Vieja volcanoes in 1949 and 1971 in La Palma in the Canary Islands. The threat was has been dramatically brought to life by a 2013 BBC Horizon programme called “Could We Survive A Mega-Tsunami?”. Unfortunately I could not find a link to the full programme but a taster can be found here.

The documentary detailed a scenario where a future eruption could cause a massive landslide of 500 km3 of rock crashing into the sea, causing multiple waves that would travel across the Atlantic Ocean and devastate major cities along the US east coast, as well as parts of Africa, Europe and southern England & Ireland. The damage would be unimaginable, causing over 4 million deaths and economic losses of over $800 billion. The impact of the damage on port and transport infrastructure would also result in horrible after event obstacles to rescue and recovery efforts.

The possibility of such a massive landslide resulting from a La Palma volcano has been disputed by many scientists. In 2006, Dutch scientists released research which stipulated that the south west flank of the island was stable and unlikely to fall into the sea for at least another 10,000 years. More recent research in 2013, has shown that 8 historical landslides associated with volcanoes in the Canary Islands have been staggered in discrete landslides and that the likelihood of one large 500 km3 landslide is therefore extremely remote. The report states:

“This has significant implications for geohazard assessments, as multistage failures reduce the magnitude of the associated tsunami. The multistage failure mechanism reduces individual landslide volumes from up to 350 km3 to less than 100 km3. Thus although multistage failure ultimately reduce the potential landslide and tsunami threat, the landslide events may still generate significant tsunamis close to source.”

Another graph from the research shows that timeframe over which such events should be viewed is in the thousands of years.

click to enlargeHistorical Volcanic & Landslide Activity Canary Islands

Whatever about the feasibility of the events dramatised in the BBC documentary, the scientists behind the latest research do highlight the difference between probability of occurrence and impact upon occurrence.

“Although the probability of a large-volume Canary Island flank collapse occurring is potentially low, this does not necessarily mean that the risk is low. Risk is dependent both on probability of occurrence and the resultant consequences of such events, namely generation of a tsunami(s). Therefore, determining landslide characteristics of past events will ultimately better inform tsunami modelling and risk assessments.”

And, after all, that’s what good risk management should be all about. Tsunami are caused by large infrequent events so, as with all natural catastrophes, we should be wary that historical event catalogues may be a poor guide to future hazards.