Tag Archives: diversification benefit

More ILS illuminations

A continuation of the theme in this post.

The pictures and stories that have emerged from the impact of the tsunami from the Sulawesi earthquake in Indonesia are heart-breaking. With nearly 2,000 officially declared dead, it is estimated that another 5,000 are missing with hundreds of thousands more severely impacted. This event will be used as an vivid example of the impact of soil liquefaction whereby water pressure generated by the earthquake causes soil to behave like a liquid with massive destructive impacts. The effect on so many people of this natural disaster in this part of the world contrasts sharply with the impact on developed countries of natural disasters. It again highlights the wealth divide within our world and how technologies in the western world could benefit so many people around the world if only money and wealth were not such a determinant of who survives and who dies from nature’s wrath.

The death toll from Hurricane Florence on the US, in contrast, is around 40 people. The possibility of another US hurricane making landfall this week, currently called Tropical Storm Michael, is unfolding. The economic losses of Hurricane Florence are currently estimated between $25 billion and $30 billion, primarily from flood damage. Insured losses will be low in comparison, with some estimates around $3-5 billion (one estimate is as high as $10 billion). The insured losses are likely to be incurred by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), private flood insurers (surplus line players including some Lloyds’ Syndicates), crop and auto insurers, with a modest level of losses ceded to the traditional reinsurance and insurance-linked securities (ILS) markets.

The reason for the low level of insured loss is the low take-up rate of flood policies (flood is excluded from standard homeowner policies), estimated around 15% of insurance policies in the impacted region, with a higher propensity on the commercial side. Florence again highlights the protection gap issue (i.e. percentage difference between insured and economic loss) whereby insurance is failing in its fundamental economic purpose of spreading the economic impact of unforeseen natural events. Indeed, the contrast with the Sulawesi earthquake shows insurance failings on a global inequality level. If insurance and the sector is not performing its economic purpose, then it simply is a rent taker and a drag on economic development.

After that last sentiment, it may therefore seem strange for me to spend the rest of this blog highlighting a potential underestimating of risk premia for improbable events when a string of events has been artfully dodged by the sector (hey, I am guilty of many inconsistencies)!

As outlined in this recent post, the insurance sector is grappling with the effect of new capital dampening pricing after the 2017 losses, directly flattening the insurance cycle. It can be argued that this new source of low-cost capital is having a positive impact on insurance availability and could be the answer to protection gap issues, such as those outlined above. And that may be true, although under-priced risk premia have a way of coming home to roost with serious longer-term effects.

The objective of most business models in the financial services sector is to maximise the risk adjusted returns from a selected portfolio, whether that be stocks or bonds for asset managers, credit risks for banks or insurance risks for insurers. Many of these firms have many thousands of potential risks to select from and so the skill or alpha that each claim derives from their ability to select risks and to build a robust portfolio. If for example, a manager wants to build a portfolio of 20 risks from a possible 100 risks, the combinations are 536 trillion (with 18 zeros as per the British definition)! And that doesn’t consider the sizing of each of the 20 positions in the portfolio. It’s no wonder that the financial sector is embracing artificial intelligence (AI) as a tool to assist firms in optimizing portfolios and potential risk weighted returns (here and here are interesting recent articles from the asset management and reinsurance sectors). I have little doubt that AI and machine learning will be a core technique in any portfolio optimisation process of the future.

I decided to look at the mechanics behind the ILS fund sector again (previous posts on the topic include this post and this old post). I constructed an “average” portfolio that broadly reflects current market conditions. It’s important to stress that there is a whole variety of portfolios that can be constructed from the relatively small number of available ILS assets out there. Some are pure natural catastrophe only, some are focused at the high excess level only, the vintage and risk profile of the assets of many will reflect the length of time they have been in business, many consist of an increasing number of private negotiated deals. As a result, the risk-return profiles of many ILS portfolios will dramatically differ from the “average”. This exercise is simply to highlight the impact of the change of several variables on an assumed, albeit imperfect, sample portfolio. The profile of my “average” sample portfolio is shown below, by exposure, expected loss and pricing.

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The weighted average expected loss of the portfolio is 2.5% versus the aggregate coupon of 5%. It’s important to highlight that the expected loss of a portfolio of low probability events can be misleading and is often misunderstood. Its not the loss expected but simply the average over all simulations. The likelihood of there being any losses is low, by definition, and in the clear majority of cases losses are small.

To illustrate the point, using my assumed loss exceedance curves for each exposure, with no correlation between the exposures except for the multi-peril coverage within each region, I looked at the distribution of losses over net premium, as below. Net premium is the aggregate coupon received less a management fee. The management fee is on assets under management and is assumed to be 1.5% for the sample portfolio, resulting in a net premium of 3.5% in the base scenario. I also looked at the impact of price increases and decreases averaging approximate +/-20% across the portfolio, resulting in net premium of 4.5% and 2.5% respectively. I guesstimate that the +20% scenario is roughly where an “average” ILS portfolio was 5 years ago.

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I have no doubt that the experts in the field would quibble with my model assumptions as they are crude. However, experience has thought me that over-modelling can lead to false sense of security and an over optimistic benefit for diversification (which is my concern about the ILS sector in general). My distributions are based upon 250,000 simulations. Others will point out that I haven’t considered the return on invested collateral assets. I would counter this with my belief that investors should only consider insurance risk premium when considering ILS investments as the return on collateral assets is a return they could make without taking any insurance risk.

My analysis shows that currently investors should only make a loss on this “average” portfolio once every 4 years (i.e. 25% of the time). Back 5 years ago, I estimate that probability at approximately 17% or roughly once every 6 years. If pricing deteriorates further, to the point where net premium is equal to the aggregate expected loss on the portfolio, that probability increases to 36% or roughly once every 3 years

The statistics on the tail show that in the base scenario of a net premium of 3.5% the 1 in 500-year aggregate loss on the portfolio is 430% of net premium compared to 340% for a net premium of 4.5% and 600% for a net premium of 2.5%. At an extreme level of a 1 in 10,000-year aggregate loss to the portfolio is 600% of net premium compared to 480% for a net premium of 4.5% and 800% for a net premium of 2.5%.

If I further assume a pure property catastrophe reinsurer (of which there are none left) had to hold capital sufficient to cover a 1 in 10,000-year loss to compete with a fully collaterised ILS player, then the 600% of net premium equates to collateral of 21%. Using reverse engineering, it could therefore be said that ILS capital providers must have diversification benefits (assuming they do collaterise at 100% rather than use leverage or hedge with other ILS providers or reinsurers) of approximately 80% on their capital to be able to compete with pure property catastrophe reinsurers. That is a significant level of diversification ILS capital providers are assuming for this “non-correlating asset class”. By the way, a more likely level of capital for a pure property catastrophe reinsurer would be 1 in 500 which means the ILS investor is likely assuming diversification benefits of more that 85%. Assuming a mega-catastrophic event or string of large events only requires marginal capital of 15% or less with other economic-driven assets may be seen to be optimistic in the future in my view (although I hope the scenario will never be illustrated in real life!).

Finally, given the pressure management fees are under in the ILS sector (as per this post), I thought it would be interesting to look at the base scenario of an aggregate coupon of 5% with different management fee levels, as below. As you would expect, the portfolio risk profile improves as the level of management fees decrease.

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Given the ongoing pressure on insurance risk premia, it is likely that pressure on fees and other expenses will intensify and the use of machines and IA in portfolio construction will increase. The commodification of insurance risks looks set to expand and increase, all driven by an over-optimistic view of diversification within the insurance class and between other asset classes. But then again, that may just lead to the more wide-spread availability of insurance in catastrophe exposed regions. Maybe one day, even in places like Sulawesi.

Beautiful Models

It has been a while since I posted on dear old Solvency II (here). As highlighted in the previous post on potential losses, the insurance sector is perceived as having robust capital levels that mitigates against the current pricing and investment return headwinds. It is therefore interesting to look at some of detail emerging from the new Solvency II framework in Europe, including the mandatory disclosures in the new Solvency and Financial Condition Report (SFCR).

The June 2017 Financial Stability report from EIOPA, the European insurance regulatory, contains some interesting aggregate data from across the European insurance sector. The graph below shows solvency capital requirement (SCR) ratios, primarily driven by the standard formula, averaging consistently around 200% for non-life, life and composite insurers. The ratio is the regulatory capital requirement, as calculated by a mandated standard formula or a firm’s own internal model, divided by assets excess liabilities (as per Solvency II valuation rules). As the risk profile of each business model would suggest, the variability around the average SCR ratio is largest for the non-life insurers, followed by life insurers, with the least volatile being the composite insurers.

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For some reason, which I can’t completely comprehend, the EIOPA Financial Stability report highlights differences in the SCR breakdown (as per the standard formula, expressed as a % of net basic SCR) across countries, as per the graph below, assumingly due to the different profiles of each country’s insurance sector.

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A review across several SFCRs from the larger European insurers and reinsurers who use internal models to calculate their SCRs highlights the differences in their risk profiles. A health warning on any such comparison should be stressed given the different risk categories and modelling methodologies used by each firm (the varying treatment of asset credit risk or business/operational risk are good examples of the differing approaches). The graph below shows each main risk category as a percentage of the undiversified total SCR.

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By way of putting the internal model components in context, the graph below shows the SCR breakdown as a percentage of total assets (which obviously reflects insurance liabilities and the associated capital held against same). This comparison is also fraught with difficulty as an (re)insurers’ total assets is not necessarily a reliable measure of extreme insurance exposure in the same way as risk weighted assets is for banks (used as the denominator in bank capital ratios). For example, some life insurers can have low insurance related liabilities and associated assets (e.g. for mortality related business) compared to other insurance products (e.g. most non-life exposures).

Notwithstanding that caveat, the graph below shows a marked difference between firms depending upon whether they are a reinsurer or insurer, or whether they are a life, non-life or composite insurer (other items such as retail versus commercial business, local or cross-border, specialty versus homogeneous are also factors).

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Initial reactions by commentators on the insurance sector to the disclosures by European insurers through SFCRs have been mixed. Some have expressed disappointment at the level and consistency of detail being disclosed. Regulators will have their hands full in ensuring that sufficiently robust standards relating to such disclosures are met.

Regulators will also have to ensure a fair and consistent approach across all European jurisdictions is adopted in calculating SCRs, particularly for those calculated using internal models, whilst avoiding the pitfall of forcing everybody to use the same assumptions and methodology. Recent reports suggest that EIOPA is looking for a greater role in approving all internal models across Europe. Systemic model risk under the proposed Basel II banking regulatory rules published in 2004 is arguably one of the contributors to the financial crisis.

Only time will tell if Solvency II has avoided the mistakes of Basel II in the handling of such beautiful models.

A Tale of Two Insurers

My negativity on the operating prospects for the reinsurance and specialty insurance sector has been articulated many times previously in this blog. Many of the same factors are impacting the broader commercial insurance market. Pricing conditions in the US and globally can be seen in the graph below.

click to enlargeUS and Global Commercial Insurance Pricing

Two insurers, at different ends of the size scale, which I have previously posted on, are AIG (more recently here and here) and Lancashire (more recently here and here). Given that a lot has happened to each since I last posted on them, I thought a quick update on both would give an interesting insight into the current market.

First up is AIG who have been under a lot of pressure from shareholders to unlock value, including a break-up plan for the insurance giant from the opportunistic rascal Carl Icahn. The graph below shows a breakdown of recent operating results (as ever with AIG longer term comparisons are hampered by their ever changing reporting segments). The improvement in the UGC mortgage insurance business has been dwarfed by the poor non-life results which were impacted by a significant reserve strengthening charge.

click to enlargeAIG PreTax Operating Income 2012 to 2015

In January, Peter Hancock (the 5th CEO since Hank Greenberg left in 2005) announced a new strategic plan to the end of 2017, the main points of which are

  • Return at least $25 billion of capital to shareholders through dividends and share buy-backs from operating profits, divestitures and other actions such as monetizing future life profits by $4-5 billion through reinsurance purchases.
  • Enhance transparency by separating into an operating portfolio with a goal of over 10% return on equity and a legacy portfolio that will focus on return of capital. Reorganize into at least nine modular, more self-contained business units to enhance accountability, transparency, and strategic flexibility.
  • Reduce general operating expenses by $1.6 billion, 14 percent of the 2015 expenses.
  • Improve the commercial P&C accident year loss ratio by six points.
  • Pursue an active divestiture program, including initially the 20% IPO of UGC.

The non-life reserve charge in 2015 amounted to $3.6 billion. 60% of the charge came from the (mainly US) casualty business, 16% from financial lines (again mainly in the US) and 15% from the run-off business. After the last material reserve strengthening in 2010, the worrying aspect of the 2015 charge is that approximately two thirds comes from accident years not yet 10 years old (which is relatively immature for long tail casualty business particularly when 42% of the charge is on excess casualty business). The impact of the reserve hikes on the commercial P&C segment can be clearly seen in the graph below.

click to enlargeAIG Commercial P&C Combined Ratio Breakdown 2008 to 2015

Perhaps the most aggressive target, given current market conditions, in the strategic plan is the 6% improvement in the commercial P&C accident year loss ratio by the end of 2017. The plan includes exiting approximately $1 billion of US casualty business, including poorly performing excess casualty business, primary and excess auto liability, health-care and financial lines business. Growth of $0.5 billion is been targeted in multi-national, financial lines, property upper middle market and major accounts which involve specialist engineering capabilities, international casualty and emerging risks such as cyber and M&A insurance. AIG also recently announced a two year reinsurance deal with Swiss Re on their US casualty book (it looks like a 25% quota share). The scale of the task for AIG in meeting this target can be seen in the exhibit below which takes a number of slides from the strategy presentation.

click to enlargeAIG Commercial P&C Metrics

I was struck by a quote from the firm on their turnaround plan – “We will use the data and analytical tools we have invested in to significantly differentiate and determine where we should focus our resources.” I suspect that every significant insurer would claim to have, or at least aspire to have, similar analytical capabilities. Big data and analytical driven underwriting is undoubtedly the future for large insurers with access to large amounts of quality data. Fortune had an interesting recent article on the analytical firm Palantir who are working with some insurers on sharpening their underwriting criteria for the social media age. An analyst in Citi even suggested that Goggle should look at buying AIG as a fintech play. The entry of the big internet firms into the insurance sector seems inevitable in some form or other, although I doubt AIG will be part of any such strategy.

As to the benefits of staying a large composite insurer, AIG cited an analysis commissioned by consultants Oliver Wyman supporting the benefits of diversification between the life and non-life business of AIG. Using the S&P consolidated model as a proxy, Oliver Wyman estimate a $7.5 billion capital benefit to AIG compared to separate life and non-life businesses, as envisaged in Icahn’s plan.

So, can AIG achieve the aggressive operational targets they have set themselves for the P&C business? Current market conditions present a considerable challenge. Combined with their recent results, an end of 2017 target for a 6% improvement is extremely aggressive. Too aggressive for my liking. However, the P&C results should improve somewhat over the short term (particularly if there is no more big reserve charges) and actions such as expense reductions, monetizing future life profits and divestitures will give AIG the fire power to hand out sweeties to shareholders. For those willing to take the punt, the return of a chunk of the $25 billion target in dividends and share buy-backs over the next 2 years for a firm with a current market value of $61 billion, trading at a 0.72 multiple to book value (trading around 0.92 of book less AOCI and DTA), may be too tempting to resist. It does have a certain allure…..

Lancashire, a London market specialty insurer and reinsurer with a mantra of disciplined underwriting, is at the opposite end of the scale spectrum with a niche focus. Long cherished by investors for its shareholder friendly dividend policies, Lancashire has been under pressure of late due to the heavy competition in its niche markets. The energy insurance sector, for example, has been described by the broker Willis as dismal with capacity chasing a smaller premium pool due to the turmoil in the oil market. A number of recent articles (such as here and here) highlight the dangers. Alex Maloney, the firm’s CEO, described the current market as “one of the most difficult trading environments during the last twenty years”. In addition, Lancashire lost its founder, Richard Brindle, in 2014 plus the CEO, the CFO and some senior underwriters of its Lloyds’ Cathedral unit in 2015.

The graph below shows the breakdown of reported historical calendar year combined ratios plus the latest accident year net loss ratio and paid ratio.

click to enlargeLancashire Ratio Breakdown 2008 to 2015

The underwriting discipline that Lancashire professes can be seen in the recent accident year loss ratios and in the 30% drop in gross written premiums (GWP), as per the graph below. The drop is more marked in net written premiums at 35% due to the increase in reinsurance spend to 25% of GWP (from approx 10% in its early years).

click to enlargeLancashire GWP Breakdown 2008 to 2015

The timely and astute increase in reinsurance protection spend can be seen in the decrease in their peak US aggregate exposures. The latest probable maximum loss (PML) estimates for their US peak exposures are approximately $200 million compared to historical levels of $300-350 million. Given the lower net premium base, the PML figures in loss ratio terms have only dropped to 40% from 50-60% historically. Lancashire summed up their reinsurance purchasing strategy as follows:

“Our outwards reinsurance programme provides a breadth and depth of cover which has helped us to strengthen our position and manage volatility. This helps us to continue to underwrite our core portfolio through the challenges posed by the cycle.”

As with AIG, the temptation for shareholders is that Lancashire will continue with their generous dividends, as the exhibit below from their Q4 2015 presentation shows.

click to enlargeLancashire Dividend History 2015

The other attraction of Lancashire is that it may become a take-over target. It currently trades at 1.4 times tangible book level which is rich compared to its US and Bermudian competitors but low compared to its peers in Lloyds’ which trade between 1.58 and 2.0 times tangible book. Lancashire itself included the exhibit below on tangible book values in its Q4 2015 presentation.

click to enlargeInsurance Tangible Book Value Multiple 2012 to 2015

It is noteworthy that there has been little activity on the insurance M&A front since the eye boggling multiples achieved by Amlin and HCC from their diversification hungry Japanese purchasers. Many in the market thought the valuations signaled the top of the M&A frenzy.

Relatively, AIG looks more attractive than Lancashire in terms of the potential for shareholder returns. However, fundamentally I cannot get away from current market conditions. Risk premia is just too low in this sector and no amount of tempting upside through dividends, buy-backs or M&A multiples can get me comfortable with the downside potential that comes with this market. As per the sentiment expressed in previous posts, I am happy with zero investment exposure to the insurance sector right now. I will watch this one play out from the sidelines.

Divine Diversification

There have been some interesting developments in the US insurance sector on the issue of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Metlife announced plans to separate some of their US life retail units to avoid the designation whilst shareholder pressure is mounting on AIG to do the same. These events are symptoms of global regulations designed to address the “too big to fail” issue through higher capital requirements. It is interesting however that these regulations are having an impact in the insurance sector rather than the more impactful issue within the banking sector (this may have to do with the situation where the larger banks will retain their SIFI status unless the splits are significant).

The developments also fly in the face of the risk management argument articulated by the insurance industry that diversification is the answer to the ills of failure. This is the case AIG are arguing to counter calls for a breakup. Indeed, the industry uses the diversification of risk in their defences against the sector being deemed of systemic import, as the exhibit below from a report on systemic risk in insurance from an industry group, the Geneva Association, in 2010 illustrates. Although the point is often laboured by the insurance sector (there still remains important correlations between each of the risk types), the graph does make a valid point.

click to enlargeEconomic Capital Breakdown for European Banks and Insurers

The 1st of January this year marked the introduction of the new Solvency II regulatory regime for insurers in Europe, some 15 years after work begun on the new regime. The new risk based solvency regime allows insurers to use their own internal models to calculate their required capital and to direct their risk management framework. A flurry of internal model approvals by EU regulators were announced in the run-up to the new year, although the amount of approvals was far short of that anticipated in the years running up to January 2016. There will no doubt be some messy teething issues as the new regime is introduced. In a recent post, I highlighted the hoped for increased disclosures from European insurers on their risk profiles which will result from Solvency II. It is interesting that Fitch came out his week and stated that “Solvency II metrics are not comparable between insurers due to their different calculation approaches and will therefore not be a direct driver of ratings” citing issues such as the application of transitional measures and different regulator approaches to internal model approvals.

I have written many times on the dangers of overtly generous diversification benefits (here, here, here, and here are just a few!) and this post continues that theme. A number of the large European insurers have already published details of their internal model calculations in annual reports, investor and analyst presentations. The graphic below shows the results from 3 large insurers and 3 large reinsurers which again illustrate the point on diversification between risk types.

click to enlargeInternal Model Breakdown for European Insurers and Reinsurers

The reinsurers show, as one would expect, the largest diversification benefit between risk types (remember there is also significant diversification benefits assumed within risk types, more on that later) ranging from 35% to 40%. The insurers, depending upon business mix, only show between 20% and 30% diversification across risk types. The impact of tax offsets is also interesting with one reinsurer claiming a further 17% benefit! A caveat on these figures is needed, as Fitch points out; as different firms use differing terminology and methodology (credit risk is a good example of significant differences). I compared the diversification benefits assumed by these firms against what the figure would be using the standard formula correlation matrix and the correlations assuming total independence between the risk types (e.g. square root of the sum of squares), as below.

click to enlargeDiversification Levels within European Insurers and Reinsurers

What can be seen clearly is that many of these firms, using their own internal models, are assuming diversification benefits roughly equal to that between those in the standard formula and those if the risk types were totally independent. I also included the diversification levels if 10% and 25% correlations were added to the correlation matrix in the standard formula. A valid question for these firms by investors is whether they are being overgenerous on their assumed diversification. The closer to total independence they are, the more sceptical I would be!

Assumed diversification within each risk type can also be material. Although I can understand arguments on underwriting risk types given different portfolio mixes, it is hard to understand the levels assumed within market risk, as the graph below on the disclosed figures from two firms show. Its hard for individual firms to argue they have material differing expectations of the interaction between interest rates, spreads, property, FX or equities!

click to enlargeDiversification Levels within Market Risk

Diversification within the life underwriting risk module can also be significant (e.g. 40% to 50%) particularly where firms write significant mortality and longevity type exposures. Within the non-life underwriting risk module, diversification between the premium, reserving and catastrophe risks also add-up. The correlations in the standard formula on diversification between business classes vary between 25% and 50%.

By way of a thought experiment, I constructed a non-life portfolio made up of five business classes (X1 to X5) with varying risk profiles (each class set with a return on equity expectation of between 10% and 12% at a capital level of 1 in 500 or 99.8% confidence level for each), as the graph below shows. Although many aggregate profiles may reflect ROEs of 10% to 12%, in my view, business classes in the current market are likely to have a more skewed profile around that range.

click to enlargeSample Insurance Portfolio Profile

I then aggregated the business classes at varying correlations (simple point correlations in the random variable generator before the imposition of the differing distributions) and added a net expense load of 5% across the portfolio (bringing the expected combined ratio from 90% to 95% for the portfolio). The different resulting portfolio ROEs for the different correlation levels shows the impact of each assumption, as below.

click to enlargePortfolio Risk Profile various correlations

The experiment shows that a reasonably diverse portfolio that can be expected to produce a risk adjusted ROE of between 14% and 12% (again at a 1 in 500 level)with correlations assumed at between 25% and 50% amongst the underlying business classes. If however, the correlations are between 75% and 100% then the same portfolio is only producing risk adjusted ROEs of between 10% and 4%.

As correlations tend to increase dramatically in stress situations, it highlights the dangers of overtly generous diversification assumptions and for me it illustrates the need to be wary of firms that claim divine diversification.