Following on from a recent post on windstorms in the US, I have taken several loss preliminary estimates recently published by firms (and these are very early estimates and therefore subject to change) and overlaid them against the South-East US probable maximum loss (PML) curves and Atlantic hurricane scenarios previously presented, as below. The range of insured losses for Harvey, Irma and Maria (now referred to as HIM) are from $70 billion to $115 billion, averaging around $90 billion.
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The loss estimates by firm depend heavily upon the risk profile of each. As a generalisation, it could be said that the aggregate US wind losses are averaging around the 1 in 100 loss level.
Given there was over $20 billion of insured losses from H1 and factoring in developing losses such as the Mexico earthquake, the California wildfires and the current windstorm Ophelia hitting Ireland, annual insured losses for 2017 could easily reach $120 billion. The graph below shows the 2016 estimates from Swiss Re and my $120 billion 2017 guesstimate (it goes without saying that much could still happen for the remainder of the year).
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At a $120 billion level of insured loss for 2017, the 10 year average increase from around $55 billion to $65 billion. In a post in early 2016, I estimated that catastrophe pricing was about 25% too low based upon annual average losses of $40 billion per year. We will see whether the 2017 losses are enough to deplete the overcapitalisation in the market and return pricing towards their technical rate. I wouldn’t hold my breath on that as although there may be material aggregate losses in the private collateralised market and other pockets of the retrocession market, the appetite of yield seeking investors will likely remain unabated in the current interest rate environment.
Although the comparison between calendar year ratios and credit defaults is fraught with credibility issues (developed accident year ratios to developed default rates are arguably more comparable), I updated my previous underwriting cycle analysis (here in 2014 and here in 2013). Taking the calendar year net loss ratios of Munich Re and Lloyds of London excluding catastrophe and large losses (H1 results for 2017), I then applied a crude discount measure using historical risk-free rates plus 100 basis points to reflect the time value of money, and called the resulting metric the adjusted loss ratio (adjusted LR). I compared these adjusted LRs for Munich and Lloyds to S&P global bond credit default rates (by year of origin), as per the graph below.
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This shows that the years of relatively benign attritional claims together with the compounding impact of soft pricing over the past years may finally be coming to an end. Time will tell. All in all, it makes for a very interesting period for the market over the next 6 to 12 months.
In the interim, let’s hope for minimal human damage from the current California wildfires and windstorm Ophelia.
Posted in General
Tagged 1 in 100 event, 1 in 200 capital, 1 in 250 event, 99.5% VaR, adjusted premium, AIR, Atlantic hurricane, California wildfires, catastrophe insurance sector, catastrophe risks, collateralised reinsurance, cost of capital, credit cycles, Eqecat, exceedance curves, fat tail, Florida windstorm, Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Irma, Hurricane Jose, hybrid capital, ILS, ILS fund, ILS funds, ILS investor, ILS market, ILS multiples, ILS pricing, insurance linked securities, insurance sector, LMX spiral, London market insurers, loss exceedance estimates, Mexico earthquake, model uncertainty, natural catastrophes, nature unpredictability, net tangible assets, PML, probable maximum losses, property catastrophe pricing, rate on line, reinsurance pricing, reinsurance rates, reserve releases, return periods, RMS, ROE normalised, ROL, sources of uncertainty, South-East US catastrophe exposure, specialty insurance, subordinate debt, tail risk, tail VaR, TVaR, underwriting cycles, US hurricanes, US wind perils, vendor models, west coast Florida, Willis Re, windstorm Ophelia, yield seeking investors
Edward Noonan of Validus is always good copy and the Q1 conference call for Validus provided some insight into the market ahead of the important July 1 renewals. When asked by an analyst whether the catastrophe market was reaching a floor, Noonan answered that “I’m starting to think we might be heading for the basement”.
He also said “I think the truly disruptive factor in the market right now is ILS money. I made a comment that we’ve always viewed the ILS manager business behaving rationally. I can’t honestly say that (anymore with) what we’re seeing in Florida right now. I mean we have large ILS managers who are simply saying – whatever they quote we will put out a multi-hundred million dollar line at 10% less.”
I have posted many times on the impact of new capital in the ILS market, more recently on the assertion that ILS funds havw a lower cost of capital. Noonan now questions whether investors in the ILS space really understand the expected loss cost as well as experienced traditional players. Getting a yield of 5% or lower now compared to 9% a few short years ago for BBB – risks is highlighted as an indication that investors lack a basic understanding of what they are buying. The growing trend of including terrorism risks in catastrophe programmes is also highlighted as a sign that the new market players are mispricing risk and lack basic understanding on issues such as a potential clash in loss definitions and wordings.
Validus highlight how they are disciplined in not renewing underpriced risk and arbitraging the market by purchasing large amounts of collaterised reinsurance and retrocession. They point to the reduction in their net risk profile by way of their declining PMLs, as the graph below of their net US wind PMLs as a percentage of net tangible assets illustrates.
This is positive provided the margins on their core portfolio don’t decrease faster than the arbitrage. For example, Validus made underwriting income in 2012 and 2013 of 6% and 17% of their respective year-end net tangible assets. The graph below also shows what the US Wind PML would be reduced by if an operating profit of 12% (my approximation of a significant loss free 2014 for Validus) could be used to offset the US Wind net losses. Continuing pricing reductions in the market could easily make a 12% operating profit look fanciful.
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I think that firms such as Validus are playing this market rationally and in the only way you can without withdrawing from core (albeit increasingly under-priced) markets. If risk is continually under-priced over the next 12 to 24 months, questions arise about the sustainability of many existing business models. You can outrun a train moving out of a station but eventually you run out of platform!
Posted in Insurance Firms, Insurance Market
Tagged CaT pricing heading for basement, catastrophe programmes, collaterised reinsurance, disciplined ILS pricing, disruptive factor, Edward Noonan, ILS, ILS funds, ILS managers, ILS pricing, insurance pricing, July 1 renewals, lack risk understanding, loss definition wordings, market discipline, mispricing risk, net PMLs, potential clashes, pricing reductions, property catastrophe rates, reinsurance pricing, risk arbitrage, risk profile, terrorism risks, underpriced risk, US Wind PML, Validus