With the S&P500 off its September high and US 10 year yields well over 3% back in October, its crazy to think that just 6 months later the 10-year yield is currently around 2.6% and the S&P500 has just hit new highs. What was all the fuss about! A return to a steady US GDP non-inflationary growth as per the Q1 figures and with Q1 earnings coming in ahead of reduced expectations (with approx. half of the S&P500 reported), one could be tempted to think we have returned to the good old Goldilocks days. My predictions (here) of a rebound off the December lows followed by more volatility in Q1 were well wide of the mark with volatility across major asset classes eerily low as the market hits new highs. My record of been wide of the mark has at least been consistent with this post from January last year calling a premature ending to Goldilocks!
Some commentators are bullish on more upside for the market on the improved economic and earnings figures and cite comparisons to similar 20% drops and recoveries in 1998 and 2011. The graph below shows the comparisons, with 2 other 20% drops (although 1957 and 1990 were during recessions).
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As to what happens next, I have no idea. Some say at 17 times forward earnings; the market is not too expensive, and a wall of money will fuel this FOMO (fear of missing out) rally. Although the positive narrative from Q1 earnings will likely dictate short term trends, the market just feels like it has gotten ahead of itself to me and I feel comfortable taking some money off the table. As the graph below of monthly moves greater than +/- 3% shows, volatility is never that far away.
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A return to economic and earnings growth also raises the question of how long the Fed can remain ultra-accommodative. The arguments on raising rates and debts levels are all very déjà vu! For the moment however, unless the China trade talks fall apart, all looks surprisingly rosy.
There are always concerns. Bank of America recently highlighted that over the past five years, US firms have paid out $3.3 trillion in dividends and bought back $2.7 trillion of their own shares ($800 billion in 2018 alone) whilst taking on $2.5 trillion of new debt. The buybacks are responsible for 30% of earnings growth according to Bank of America (20% in 2018). The need to pay down this debt was a focus for many firms in the stock market rout. Bank of America predict further upside in equities to the summer before a pullback in Q3. The ever-excellent John Authers (ex-FT columnist now with Bloomberg) had an insightful article on corporate debt in March.
According to a recent report from Euler Hermes, the non-bank leveraged loan market is flattering the overall US corporate debt profile and corporate spreads are likely under estimating risk. This report from Moodys suggests that high leverage is offset by ample coverage of net interest expense. In this report, S&P estimate that “the proportion of companies having aggressive or highly leveraged financial risk has risen slightly to 61% (compared to 2009)”. Regulators also remain concerned about debt levels, particularly leveraged loans as per this recent report. The size of the leveraged loan market globally is estimated around $1.5 trillion, with the Bank of England estimates shown below.
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According to Ron Temple of Lazard Asset Management the “deterioration in underwriting standards for leveraged loans is increasingly worrisome” and the graph below shows the increased leverage in the market which combined with lax terms (approx. 80% are covenant lite loans) are a red flag in the event of any downturn.
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The buoyant private equity market is a testament to the joys of leverage, with recent PE raisings hitting records and an estimated $1.3 trillion of undeployed capital as of March. In this recent FT article, Jonathan Lavine of Bain Capital warned that private equity groups are taking on too much debt in the competition to win deals (the Bain 2019 market report is well worth a read).
Still, these are all things to worry about in times of stress. As of now, let’s enjoy Goldilocks return and keep dancing. Carefully mind you, it is late and we don’t want to wake those bears.
Posted in Equity Market
Tagged Bain Capital, Bank of America, Bank of England, buybacks, Chasing FOMO, China trade talks, corporate debt, covenant lite loans, dividends, eerily low volatility, Euler Hermes, fear of missing out, Fed interest rates, FOMO, Goldilocks returns, high leverage, John Authers, Jonathan Lavine, lax loan terms, Lazard Asset Management, leveraged loan market, market volatility, net interest expense cove, non-bank leveraged loan, non-inflationary growth, private equity market, Ron Temple, S&P 500 EPS estimate, S&P 500 monthly volatility, S&P500 record high, ultra-accommodative, uncertainty, undeployed capital, underwriting standards
The economist Sir John Vickers, himself an ex Bank of England Chief Economist, recently had a pop at the current Bank of England’s governor and chair of the Financial Stability Board, Mark Carney. He countered Carney’s assertion that “the largest banks are required to have as much as ten times more of the highest quality capital than before the crisis” with the quip that “ten times better than hopelessly lax is not a useful measure”. I particularly liked Vickers observation that equity capital is “a residual, the difference between two typically big numbers, of which the asset side is hard to measure given the nature of banking, and dependent on accounting rules”.
In a recent article in the FT, Martin Wolf joined in the Carney bashing by saying the ten times metric “is true only if one relies on the alchemy of risk-weighting” and that banking regulatory requirements have merely “gone from the insane to the merely ridiculous” since the crisis. Wolf acknowledges that “banks are in better shape, on many fronts, than they were a decade ago” but concludes that “their balance sheets are still not built to survive a big storm”.
I looked through a few of the bigger banks’ reports (randomly selected) across Europe and the US to see what their current risk weighted assets (RWA) as a percentage of total assets and their tier 1 common equity (CET1) ratios looked like, as below. The wide range of RWAs to total assets, indicative of the differing business focus for each bank, contrasts against the relatively similar level of core “equity” buffers.
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Wolf and Vickers both argue that higher capital levels, such as those cited by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig in The Bankers’ New Clothes, or more radical structural reform, such as that proposed by Mervyn King (see this post), should remain a goal for current policymakers like Carney.
The latest IMF Stability Report, published yesterday, has an interesting exhibit showing an adjusted capital ratio (which includes reserves against expected losses) for the global systemically important banks (GSIBs), as below.
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This exhibit confirms an increased capital resilience for the big banks. Hardly the multiple increases in safety that Mr Carney’s statements imply however.
Posted in Economics
Tagged adjusted capital ratio, Anat Admati, bank capital, Bank of England, banking regulatory requirements, banking supervision, Basel III, CET1, Chief Economist, expected losses, Financial Stability Board, global systemically important banks, GSIBs, GSIFs, highest quality capital, hopelessly lax, IFRS9, IMF Stability Report, Mark Carney, Martin Hellwig, Martin Wolf, Mervyn King, pawnbrokers for all seasons, risk weighted assets, RWA, Sir John Vickers, The Bankers’ New Clothes, tier 1 common equity
Businesses with strong cash-flow are rightfully held in high esteem as investments. Google and Apple are good examples. Betting/gambling firms and insurers (in non-stressed loss periods) are other examples of businesses, if properly run, that can operate with high positive cash-flow.
The banking sector is at a completely different end of the spectrum as liquidity transformation is essentially the business. Everybody knows of Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, which was instigated in late 2008 by an immediate need to find $3 billion of cash to meet its obligations. The winding-up of the Lehman Brothers holding company in the US is estimated to return approximately 26 cents on the dollar according to this FT article. It was therefore a surprise to read in the FT article and in another recent article on the expected surplus of £6 to £7 billion from the winding up of Lehman Brothers operation in London after all of the ordinary creditors have been repaid in full. This outcome is particularly surprising as I understood that the US operation of Lehman did a cash sweep across the group, including London, just prior to entering bankruptcy.
In his book (as referenced in this post), Martin Wolf highlights the changing perceptions of value since the crisis by using ABX indices from Markit which represent a standardized basket of home equity asset backed securities. The graph below shows the value for one such index, the ABX.HE.1, to the end of 2011. These indices are infamous as they were commonly used to value securities since the crisis when confidence collapsed and can be used to demonstrate the perils of mark to market/model accounting (or more accurately referred to as mark to myth values!).
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I have included the more recent values of similar ABX indices in the bubbles as at last year from Wolf’s book. This graph accentuates the oft used quote from Keynes that “the market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent”.
Wolf argues that the 3% liquidity ratio proposed under Basel III or indeed the 5% proposed in the UK are totally inadequate and he suggests a liquidity ratio closer to 10%. On capital ratios, Wolf argues for capital ratios of 20% and above with a strong emphasis on tier 1 type equity or bail-inable debt that automatically converts. This contrasts against the 6% and 2.5% of tier 1 and 2 capital proposed respectively under Basel III (plus a countercyclical and G-SIFI buffer of up to 5%). Wolf also highlights the bankers ability to game the risk weighted asset rules and suggests that simple capital ratios based upon all assets are simpler and cleaner.
Wolf supports his arguments with research by Bank of England staffers like David Miles1 and Andrew Haldane2 and references a 2013 book3 from Admati and Hellwing on the banking sector. Critics of higher liquidity and capital ratios point to the damage that high ratios could do to business lending, despite the relatively low level of business lending that made up the inflated financing sector prior to the crisis. It also ignores, well, the enormous cost of the bailing out failed banks for many tax payers!
For me, it strengthens the important of liquidity profiles in investing. It also reinforces a growing suspicion that the response to the crisis is trying to fix a financial system that is fundamentally broken.
- Optimal Bank Capital by David Miles, Jing Yang and Gilberto Marcheggiano
- The Dog and the Frisbee by Andrew Haldane
- The Bankers New Cloths by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwing
Posted in Economics
Tagged ABX indices, ABX.HE.1, Admati and Hellwing, Andrew Haldane, bail-inable debt, Bank of England, banking sector, Basel III, capital ratio, confidence collapsed, countercyclical buffer, David Miles, fix financial system, G-SIFI capital buffer, home equity asset backed securities, Keynes, Lehman Brothers, Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, Lehman Brothers holding company, liquidity profiles, liquidity ratio, liquidity transformation, mark to market accounting, mark to model, mark to myth values, Markit, Martin Wolf, remain irrational, remain solvent, risk weighted assets, solvency ratio, standardized basket, strong cash-flow, subprime mortgages, synthetic CDOs, tier 1 equity, value securities, Why Liquidity Rules