Tag Archives: Berkshire Hathaway

Hedge Blues

For many years Warren Buffet has been highlighting the benefits of investing in a low cost index fund over paying return sapping fees to professional “helpers”. In Buffet’s 2016 letter, released over the weekend, he estimates approx $100 billion in fees have been wasted by investors in the past decade in “the search by the elite for superior investment advice”.

The selected returns by hedge funds, specifically fund of funds, since 2008 in the letter make Buffet’s point strongly (those funds were selected by Ted Seides in the wager with Buffet). Although I have no love for the overpaid superheros of the hedge fund world, Buffet’s wager has the tail wind of a particularly bad run of returns from the hedgies of late. The graph below shows the average 10 year returns from the S&P500 (including dividends less 15 basis points for fees) against hedge fund returns, net of fees, from the BarclayHedge website (I only selected those categories with more than 99 funds included).

click to enlarge10-year-average-hedge-fund-returns-2006-to-2016

Clearly, the 10 year averages for the past 5 years haven’t been kind to the masters of the universe. That may be reflective of a permanent change in markets, due to anything from more regulation to the era of low risk premia to less leverage to size. Buffet puts it down to success attracting too much capital and managers subsequent addiction to fees. I do like the explanation given by Bill Ruane from Buffet’s letter in the following quote – “In investment management, the progression is from the innovators to the imitators to the swarming incompetents.”

Oh AIG, where art thou?

In my last post on AIG, I expressed my doubts about the P&C targets outlined in their plan. After first announcing a $20 billion retroactive reinsurance deal with Berkshire covering long tail commercial P&C reserves for accident years prior to 2015 in January, AIG just announced another large commercial lines reserve charge of $5.6 billion principally from their US business. The graph below shows the impact upon their 2016 pre-tax operating income.

click to enlargeaig-pretax-operating-income-2012-to-2016

The latest reserve hit amounts to 12% of net commercial reserves at end Q3 2016 and compares to 7%, 8% and 6% for previous 2015, 2010, and 2009 commercial reserve charges. Whereas previously reserve strengthening related primarily to excess casualty and workers compensation (WC) business (plus an asbestos charge in 2010), this charge also covers primary casualty and WC business. The accident year vintage of the releases is also worryingly immature, as the graph below shows. After the 2016 charge, AIG have approx $7 billion of cover left on the Berkshire coverage.

click to enlargeaig-reserve-strengthening-accident-year-distribution

Although AIG have yet again made adjustments to business classifications, the graph below shows near enough the development of the accident year loss ratios on the commercial book over recent times.

click to enlargeaig-commercial-pc-accident-year-loss-ratios-2011-to-2016

It is understandable that AIG missed their aggressive target against the pricing background of the past few years as illustrated by the latest Marsh report, as the exhibits below on global commercial rates and the US and European subsets show.

click to enlargeglobal-insurance-market-index

click to enlargeus-europe-insurance-market-index

All of these factors would make me very skeptical on the targeted 62% exit run rate for the 2017 accident year loss ratio on the commercial book. And no big reinsurance deal with Berkshire (or with Swiss Re for that matter) or $5 billion of share buybacks (AIG shares outstanding is down nearly a third since the beginning of 2014 due to buybacks whilst the share price is up roughly 25% over that period), can impact the reality which AIG has now to achieve. No small ask.

Some may argue that AIG have kitchen-sinked the reserves to make the target of accident year loss ratios in the low 60’s more achievable. I hope for the firm’s sake that turns out to be true (against the odds). The alternative may be more disposals of profitable (life) businesses, possibly eventually leading to a sale of the rump and maybe the disappearance of AIG altogether.