Tag Archives: insurance linked securities

Slim pickings in the risk premia extraction game

One of my favourite investing quotes is one from Jim Leitner in Steve Drobny’s excellent book “The Invisible Hands” where he said “investing is the art and science of extracting risk premia from financial markets over time“. Well, there is not much over-priced risk premia to extract these days!

A recent piece on CNBC highlighted the convergence in some sovereign yields as a result of Central Bank intervention in markets. The graph below shows how the 10 year government yield from Spain has converged on that of the US.

click to enlarge10 year Government Yields

In fact, todays’ yields from Italy, Spain & Ireland are within 43, 38 & 15 basis points of the US! Does it make sense from a risk perspective that these countries are so closely priced compared to the US? Clearly not, market prices are being distorted by loose monetary policy across the developed world.

In today’s FT, Martin Wolf highlights the damage that low interest rates can do over the long term (it has been 5 years now after all). He finishes the article with this paragraph:

“Low interest rates are certainly unpopular, particularly with cautious rentiers. But cautious rentiers no longer serve a useful economic purpose. What is needed instead are genuinely risk-taking investors. In their absence, governments need to use their balance sheets to build productive assets. There is little sign that they will. If so, central banks will be driven towards cheap money. Get used to it: this will endure.”

Examples of low risk premia are everywhere. From corporate spreads (as per the graph below), to the influx of capital into insurance linked securities (ILS), to inflated valuations in the stock market.

click to enlargeFRED graph high yield vrs corporate AAA

A recent Bloomberg article cites two market strategists – Chris Verrone of Strategas Research Partners and Carter Worth of Stern Agee – who recommend the purchase of insurance to protect against a stock market pullback. The article states the following:

“While we are not ready to sell stocks across-the-board — there’s still plenty of global support from central banks — we think insuring against a potential pullback makes sense. So we are buying an at-the-money put on the S&P 500 Index with a 30-day maturity. Specifically, we’re looking at the 187 strike put which expires June 6, 2014. It costs $2.54, which equates to 1.4 percent. This is a premium we’re happy to pay in order to sleep more soundly.”

As regular readers will know, I believe a cautious approach is justified in today’s market and, where risk positions have to be maintained, protection using instruments such as options should be sought (if possible). If investing is all about extracting risk premia over time and risk premia is currently mispriced across multiple markets, then the obvious thing to do is simply to go and do something else until those markets correct.

The difficulty is that central bank strategies, as Martin Wolf highlights, are centred on keeping risk premia artificially low over the medium term to stimulate growth through consumption. It is also worrying that when David Einhorn, the hedge fund manager, got to discuss longer term monetary strategy with Ben Bernanke at a dinner in March he concluded that “it was sort of frightening because the answers were not better than I thought they would be”.

ILS Fund versus PropertyCat Reinsurer ROEs

Regular readers will know that I have queried how insurance-linked securities (ILS) funds, currently so popular with pensions funds, can produce a return on equity that is superior to that of a diversified property catastrophe reinsurer given that the reinsurer only has to hold a faction of its aggregate limit issued as risk based capital whereas all of the limits in ILS are collaterised. The recent FT article which contained some interesting commentary from John Seo of Fermat Capital Management got me thinking about this subject again. John Seo referred to the cost advantage of ILS funds and asserted that reinsurers staffed with overpaid executives “can grow again, but only after you lay off two out of three people”. He damned the traditional sector with “these guys have been so uncreative, they have been living off earthquake and hurricane risks that are not that hard to underwrite.

Now, far be it from me to defend the offshore chino loving reinsurance executives with a propensity for large salaries and low taxation. However, I still can’t see that the “excessive” overheads John Seo refers to could offset the capital advantage that a traditional property catastrophe reinsurer would have over ILS collateral requirements.

I understood the concept of ILS structures that provided blocks of capacity at higher layers, backed by high quality assets, which could (and did until recently) command a higher price than the traditional market. Purchasers of collaterised coverage could justify paying a premium over traditional coverage by way of large limits on offer and a lower counterparty credit risk (whilst lowering concentration risk to the market leading reinsurers). This made perfect sense to me and provided a complementary, yet different, product to that offered by traditional reinsurers. However, we are now in a situation whereby such collaterised reinsurance providers may be moving to compete directly with traditional coverage on price and attachment.

To satisfy my unease around the inconsistency in equity returns, I decided to do some simple testing. I set up a model of a reasonably diversified portfolio of 8 peak catastrophic risks (4 US and 4 international wind and quake peak perils). The portfolio broadly reflects the market and is split 60:40 US:International by exposure and 70:30 by premium. Using aggregate exceedance probability (EP) curves for each of the main 8 perils based off extrapolated industry losses as a percentage of limits offered across standard return periods, the model is set up to test differing risk premiums (i.e. ROL) for each of the 8 perils in the portfolio and their returns.  For the sake of simplicity, zero correlations were assumed between the 8 perils.

The first main assumption in the model is the level of risk based capital needed by the property catastrophe reinsurer to compete against the ILS fund. Reviewing some of the Bermudian property catastrophe players, equity (common & preferred) varies between 280% and 340% of risk premiums (net of retrocessions). Where debt is also included, ratios of up to 400% of net written premiums can be seen. However, the objective is to test different premium levels and therefore setting capital levels as a function of premiums distorts the results. As reinsurer’s capital levels are now commonly assessed on the basis of stressed economic scenarios (e.g. PMLs as % of capital), I did some modelling and concluded that a reasonable capital assumption for the reinsurer to be accepted is the level required at a 99.99th percentile or a 1 in 10,000 return period (the graph below shows the distribution assumed). As the graph below illustrates, this equates to a net combined ratio (net includes all expenses) of the reinsurer of approximately 450% for the average risk premium assumed in the base scenario (the combined ratio at the 99.99th level will change as the average portfolio risk premium changes).

click to enlargePropCAT Reinsurer Combined Ratio Distribution

So with the limit profile of the portfolio is set to broadly match the market, risk premiums per peril were also set according to market rates such that the average risk premium from the portfolio was 700 bps in a base scenario (again broadly where I understand the property catastrophe market is currently at).

Reviewing some of the actual figures from property catastrophe reinsurer’s published accounts, the next important assumption is that the reinsurer’s costs are made up of 10% acquisition costs and 20% overhead (the overhead assumption is a bit above the actual rates seen by I am going high to reinforce Mr Seo’s point about greedy reinsurance executives!) thereby reducing risk premiums by 30%. For the ILS fund, the model assumes a combined acquisition and overhead cost of just 10% (this may also be too light as many ILS funds are now sourcing some of their business through brokers and many reinsurance fund managers share the greedy habits of the traditional market!).

The results below show the average simulated returns for a reinsurer and an ILS fund writing the same portfolio with the expense levels as detailed above (i.e 30% versus 10%), and with different capital levels (reinsurer at 99.99th percentile and the ILS fund with capital equal to the limits issued). It’s important to stress that the figures below do not included investment income so historical operating ROEs from property catastrophe reinsurers are not directly comparable.

click to enlargePropCAT Reinsurer & ILS Fund ROE Comparison

So, the conclusion of the analysis re-enforces my initial argument that the costs savings cannot compensate for the leveraged nature of a reinsurer’s business model compared to the ILS fully funded model. However, this is a simplistic comparison. Why would a purchaser not go with a fully funded ILS provider if the product on offer was exactly the same as that of a reinsurer? As outlined above, both risk providers serve different needs and, as yet, are not full on competitors (although this may be the direction of the changes underway in the market currently).

Also, many ILS funds likely do use some form of leverage in their business model whether by way of debt or retrocession facilities. And competition from the ILS market is making the traditional market look at its overhead and how it can become more cost efficient. So it is likely that both business models will adapt and converge (indeed, many reinsurers are now also ILS managers).

Notwithstanding these issues, I can’t help conclude that (for some reason) our pension funds are the losers here by preferring the lower returns of an ILS fund sold to them by investment bankers than the higher returns on offer from simply owning the equity of a reinsurer (admittedly without the same operational risk profile). Innovative or just cheap risk premia? Go figure.

Does financial innovation always end in reduced risk premia?

Quarterly reports from Willis Re and Aon Benfield highlight the impact on US catastrophe pricing from the new capital flowing into the insurance sector through insurance linked securities (ILS) and collaterised covers. Aon Benfield stated that “clients renewing significant capacity in the ILS market saw their risk adjusted pricing decrease by 25 to 70 percent for peak U.S. hurricane and earthquake exposed transactions” and that “if the financial management of severe catastrophe outcomes can be attained at multiple year terms well inside the cost of equity capital, then at the extreme, primary property growth in active zones could resume for companies previously restricting supply”.

This represents a worrying shift in the sector. Previously, ILS capacity was provided at rates at least equal to and often higher than that offered by the traditional market. The rationale for a higher price made sense as the cover provided was fully collaterized and offered insurers large slices of non-concentrated capacity on higher layers in their reinsurance programmes. The source of the shift is significant new capacity being provided by yield seeking investors lured in by uncorrelated returns. The Economist’s Buttonwood had an article recently entitled “Desperately seeking yield” highlighting that spreads on US investment grade corporate bonds have halved in the past 5 years to about 300bps currently. Buttonwood’s article included Bill Gross’s comment that “corporate credit and high-yield bonds are somewhat exuberantly and irrationally priced”. As a result, money managers are searching for asset classes with higher yields and, by magic, ILS offers a non-correlating asset class with superior yield.  Returns as per those from Eurekahedge on the artemis.bm website in the exhibit below highlight the attraction.

ILS Returns EurekahedgeSuch returns have been achieved on a limited capacity base with rationale CAT risk pricing. The influx of new capital means a larger base, now estimated at $35 billion of capacity up from approximately $5 billion in 2005, which is contributing to the downward risk pricing pressures under way. The impact is particularly been felt in US CAT risks as these are the exposures offering the highest rate on lines (ROL) globally and essential risks for any new ILS fund to own if returns in excess of 500 bps are to be achieved. The short term beneficiaries of the new capacity are firms like Citizens and Allstate who are getting collaterised cover at a reduced risk premium.

The irony in this situation is that these same money managers have in recent years shunned traditional wholesale insurers, including professional CAT focussed firms such as Montpelier Re, which traded at or below tangible book value. The increase in ILS capacity and the resulting reduction of risk premia will have a destabilising impact upon the risk diversification and therefore the risk profile of traditional insurers. Money managers, particularly pension funds, may have to pay for this new higher yielding uncorrelated asset class by taking a hit on their insurance equities down the road!

Financial innovation, yet again, may not result in an increase in the size of the pie, as originally envisaged, but rather mean more people chasing a smaller “mispriced” pie. Sound familiar? When thinking of the vast under-pricing of risk that the theoretical maths driven securitisation innovations led to in the mortgage market, the wise words of the Buffet come to mind – “If you have bad mortgages….they do not become better by repackaging them”. Hopefully the insurance sector will avoid those mistakes!