Tag Archives: equity markets

A naughty or nice 2019?

They say if you keep making the same prediction, at some stage it will come true. Well, my 2018 post a year ago on the return of volatility eventually proved prescient (I made the same prediction for 2017!). Besides the equity markets (multiple posts with the latest one here), the non-company specific topics covered in this blog in 2018 ranged from the telecom sector (here), insurance (here, here, and here), climate change (here and here), to my own favourite posts on artificial intelligence (here, here and here).

The most popular post (by far thanks to a repost by InsuranceLinked)) this year was on the Lloyds’ of London market (here) and I again undertake to try to post more on insurance specific topics in 2019. My company specific posts in 2018 centered on CenturyLink (CTL), Apple (AAPL), PaddyPowerBetfair (PPB.L), and Nvidia (NVDA). Given that I am now on the side-lines on all these names, except CTL, until their operating results justify my estimate of fair value and the market direction is clearer, I hope to widen the range of firms I will post on in 2019, time permitting. Although this blog is primarily a means of trying to clarify my own thoughts on various topics by means of a public diary of sorts, it is gratifying to see that I got the highest number of views and visitors in 2018. I am most grateful to you, dear reader, for that.

In terms of predictions for the 2019 equity markets, the graph below shows the latest targets from market analysts. Given the volatility in Q4 2018, it is unsurprising that the range of estimates for 2019 is wider than previously. At the beginning of 2018, the consensus EPS estimate for the S&P500 was $146.00 with an average multiple just below 20. Current 2018 estimates of $157.00 resulted in a multiple of 16 for the year end S&P500 number. The drop from 20 to 16 illustrates the level of uncertainty in the current market

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For 2019, the consensus EPS estimate is (currently) $171.00 with an average 2019 year-end target of 2,900 implying a 17 multiple. Given that this EPS estimate of 9% growth includes sectors such as energy with an assumed healthy 10% EPS growth projection despite the oil price drop, it’s probable that this EPS estimate will come down during the upcoming earnings season as firms err on the conservative side for their 2019 projections.

The bears point to building pressures on top-line growth and on record profit margins. The golden boy of the moment, Michael Wilson of Morgan Stanley, calls the current 2019 EPS estimates “lofty”. The bulls point to the newly established (as of last Friday) Powell Put and the likely resolution of the US-China trade spat (because both sides need it). I am still dubious on a significant or timely relaxation of global quantitative tightening and don’t feel particularly inclined to bet money on the Orange One’s negotiating prowess with China. My guess is the Chinese will give enough for a fudge but not enough to satisfy Trump’s narcissistic need (and political need?) for a visible outright victory. The NAFTA negotiations and his stance on the Wall show outcomes bear little relation to the rhetoric of the man. These issues will be the story of 2019. Plus Brexit of course (or as I suspect the lack thereof).

Until we get further insight from the Q4 earnings calls, my current base assumption of 4% EPS growth to $164 with a multiple of 15 to 16 implies the S&P500 will be range bound around current levels of 2,400 – 2,600. Hopefully with less big moves up or down!

Historically, a non-recessionary bear market lasts on average 7 months according to Ed Clissold of Ned Davis Research (see their 2019 report here). According to Bank of America, since 1950 the S&P 500 has endured 11 retreats of 12% or more in prolonged bull markets with these corrections lasting 8 months on average. The exhibit below suggests that such corrections only take 5 months to recover peak to trough.

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To get a feel for the possible direction of the S&P500 over 2019, I looked at the historical path of the index over 300 trading days after a peak for 4 non-recessionary and 4 recessionary periods (remember recessions are usually declared after they have begun), as below.

Note: These graphs have been subsequently updated for the S&P500 close to the 18th January 2019. 

click to enlarges&p500 q42018 drop compared to 4 nonrecession drops in 1962 1987 1998 & 2015 updated

 

click to enlarges&p500 q42018 drop compared to 4 recession drops in 1957 1974 1990 & 2000 updated

 

I will leave it to you, dear reader, to decide which path represents the most likely one for 2019. It is interesting that the 1957 track most closely matches the moves to date  (Ed: as per the date of the post, obviously not after that date!) but history rarely exactly rhymes. I have no idea whether 2019 will be naughty or nice for equity investors. I can predict with 100% certainty that it will not be dull….

Given that Brightwater’s pure Alpha fund has reportingly returned an impressive 14.6% for 2018 net of fees, I will leave the last word to Ray Dalio, who has featured regularly in this blog in 2018, as per his recent article (which I highly recommend):

Typically at this phase of the short-term debt cycle (which is where we are now), the prices of the hottest stocks and other equity-like assets that do well when growth is strong (e.g., private equity and real estate) decline and corporate credit spreads and credit risks start to rise. Typically, that happens in the areas that have had the biggest debt growth, especially if that happens in the largely unregulated shadow banking system (i.e., the non-bank lending system). In the last cycle, it was in the mortgage debt market. In this cycle, it has been in corporate and government debt markets.

When the cracks start to appear, both those problems that one can anticipate and those that one can’t start to appear, so it is especially important to identify them quickly and stay one step ahead of them.

So, it appears to me that we are in the late stages of both the short-term and long-term debt cycles. In other words, a) we are in the late-cycle phase of the short-term debt cycle when profit and earnings growth are still strong and the tightening of credit is causing asset prices to decline, and b) we are in the late-cycle phase of the long-term debt cycle when asset prices and economies are sensitive to tightenings and when central banks don’t have much power to ease credit.

A very happy and healthy 2019 to all.

The Bionic Invisible Hand

Technology is omnipresent. The impacts of technology on markets and market structures are a topic of much debate recently. Some point to its influence to explain the lack of volatility in equity markets (ignoring this week’s wobble). Marko Kolanovic, a JPMorgan analyst, has been reported to have estimated that a mere 10% US equity market trading is now conducted by discretionary human traders.

The first wave of high frequency trading (HFT) brought about distortive practises by certain players such as front running and spoofing, as detailed in Michael Lewis’s bestselling exposé Flash Boys. Now HFT firms are struggling to wring profits from the incremental millisecond, as reported in this FT article, with 2017 revenues for HFT firms trading US stocks falling below $1 billion in 2017 from over $7 billion in 2009, according to the consultancy Tabb Group. According to Doug Duquette of Vertex Analytics “it has got to the point where the speed is so ubiquitous that there really isn’t much left to get”.

The focus now is on the impact of various rules-based automatic investment systems, ranging from exchange traded funds (ETFs) to computerised high-speed trading programs to new machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) innovations. As Tom Watson said about HFT in 2011, these new technologies have the potential to give “Adam Smith’s invisible hand a bionic upgrade by making it better, stronger and faster like Steve Austin in the Six Million Dollar Man”.

As reported in another FT article, some experts estimate that computers are now generating around 50% to 70% of trading in equity markets, 60% of futures and more than 50% of treasuries. According to Morningstar, by year-end 2017 the total assets of actively managed funds stood at $11.4 trillion compared with $6.7 trillion for passive funds in the US.

Although the term “quant fund” covers a multitude of mutual and hedge fund strategies, assuming certain classifications are estimated to manage around $1 trillion in assets out of total assets under management (AUM) invested in mutual funds globally of over $40 trillion. It is believed that machine learning or AI only drives a small subset of quant funds’ trades although such systems are thought to be used as investment tools for developing strategies by an increasing number of investment professionals.

Before I delve into these issues further, I want to take a brief detour into the wonderful world of quantitative finance expert Paul Wilmott and his recent book, with David Orrell, called “The Money Formula: Dodgy Finance, Pseudo Science, and How Mathematicians Took Over the Markets”. I am going to try to summarize the pertinent issues highlighted by the authors in the following sequence of my favourite quotes from the book:

“If anybody can flog an already sick horse to death, it is an economist.”

“Whenever a model becomes too popular, it influences the market and therefore tends to undermine the assumptions on which it was built.”

“Real price data tend to follow something closer to a power-law distribution and are characterized by extreme events and bursts of intense volatility…which are typical of complex systems that are operating at a state known as self-organized criticality…sometimes called the edge of chaos.”

“In quantitative finance, the weakest links are the models.”

“The only half decent, yet still toy, models in finance are the lognormal random walk models for those instruments whose level we don’t care about.”

“The more apparently realistic you make a model, the less useful it often becomes, and the complexity of the equations turns the model into a black box. The key then is to keep with simple models, but make sure that the model is capturing the key dynamics of the system, and only use it within its zone of validity.”

“The economy is not a machine, it is a living, organic system, and the numbers it produces have a complicated relationship with the underlying reality.”

“Calibration is a simple way of hiding model risk, you choose the parameters so that your model superficially appears to value everything correctly when really, it’s doing no such thing.”

“When their [quants] schemes, their quantitative seizing – cratered, the central banks stepped in to fill the hole with quantitative easing.”

“Bandwagons beget bubbles, and bubbles beget crashes.”

“Today, it is the risk that has been created by high speed algorithms, all based on similar models, all racing to be the first to do the same thing.”

“We have outsourced ethical judgments to the invisible hand, or increasingly to algorithms, with the result that our own ability to make ethical decisions in economic matters has atrophied.”

According to Morningstar’s annual fund flow report, flows into US mutual funds and ETFs reached a record $684.6 billion in 2017 due to massive inflows into passive funds. Among fund categories, the biggest winners were passive U.S. equity, international equity and taxable bond funds with each having inflows of more than $200 billion. “Indexing is no longer limited to U.S. equity and expanding into other asset classes” according to the Morningstar report.

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Paul Singer of Elliott hedge fund, known for its aggressive activism and distressed debt focus (famous for its Argentine debt battles), dramatically said “passive investing is in danger of devouring capitalism” and called it “a blob which is destructive to the growth-creating and consensus-building prospects of free market capitalism”.

In 2016, JP Morgan’s Nikolaos Panagirtzoglou stated that “the shift towards passive funds has the potential to concentrate investments to a few large products” and “this concentration potentially increases systemic risk making markets more susceptible to the flows of a few large passive products”. He further stated that “this shift exacerbates the market uptrend creating more protracted periods of low volatility and momentum” and that “when markets eventually reverse, the correction becomes deeper and volatility rises as money flows away from passive funds back towards active managers who tend to outperform in periods of weak market performance”.

The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), proving that regulators are always late to the party (hopefully not too late), is to broaden its analysis on the ETF sector in 2018, beyond a previous review on liquidity management, to consider whether serious market distortions might occur due to the growth of ETFs, as per this FT article. Paul Andrews, a veteran US regulator and secretary general of IOSCO, called ETFs “financial engineering at its finest”, stated that “ETFs are [now] a critical piece of market infrastructure” and that “we are on autopilot in many respects with market capitalisation-weighted ETFs”.

Artemis Capital Management, in this report highlighted in my previous post, believe that “passive investing is now just a momentum play on liquidity” and that “large capital flows into stocks occur for no reason other than the fact that they are highly liquid members of an index”. Artemis believes that “active managers serve as a volatility buffer” and that if such a buffer is withdrawn then “there is no incremental seller to control overvaluation on the way up and no incremental buyer to stop a crash on the way down”.

Algorithmic trading (automated trading, black-box trading, or simply algo-trading) is the process of using computers programmed to follow a defined set of instructions for placing a trade in order to generate profits at a speed and frequency that is impossible for a human trader.

Machine learning uses statistical techniques to infer relationships between data. The artificial intelligence “agent” does not have an algorithm to tell it which relationships it should find but infers, or learns if you like, from the data using statistical analysis to revise its hypotheses. In supervised learning, the machine is presented with examples of input data together with the desired output. The AI agent works out a relationship between the two and uses this relationship to make predictions given further input data. Supervised learning techniques, such as Bayesian regression, are useful where firms have a flow of input data and would like to make predictions.

Unsupervised learning, in contrast, does without learning examples. The AI agent instead tries to find relationships between input data by itself. Unsupervised learning can be used for classification problems determining which data points are similar to each other. As an example of unsupervised learning, cluster analysis is a statistical technique whereby data or objects are classified into groups (clusters) that are similar to one another but different from data or objects in other clusters.

Firms like Bloomberg use cluster analysis in their liquidity assessment tool which aims to cluster bonds with sufficiently similar behaviour so their historical data can be shared and used to make general predictions for all bonds in that cluster. Naz Quadri of Bloomberg, with the wonderful title of head of quant engineering and research, said that “some applications of clustering were more useful than others” and that their analysis suggests “clustering is most useful, and results are more stable, when it is used with a structural market impact model”. Market impact models are widely used to minimise the effect of a firm’s own trading on market prices and are an example of machine learning in practise.

In November 2017, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) released a report called “Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Financial Services”. In the report the FSB highlighted some of the current and potential use cases of AI and machine learning, as follows:

  • Financial institutions and vendors are using AI and machine learning methods to assess credit quality, to price and market insurance contracts, and to automate client interaction.
  • Institutions are optimising scarce capital with AI and machine learning techniques, as well as back-testing models and analysing the market impact of trading large positions.
  • Hedge funds, broker-dealers, and other firms are using AI and machine learning to find signals for higher (and uncorrelated) returns and optimise trading execution.
  • Both public and private sector institutions may use these technologies for regulatory compliance, surveillance, data quality assessment, and fraud detection.

The FSB report states that “applications of AI and machine learning could result in new and unexpected forms of interconnectedness” and that “the lack of interpretability or ‘auditability’ of AI and machine learning methods has the potential to contribute to macro-level risk”. Worryingly they say that “many of the models that result from the use of AI or machine learning techniques are difficult or impossible to interpret” and that “many AI and machine learning developed models are being ‘trained’ in a period of low volatility”. As such “the models may not suggest optimal actions in a significant economic downturn or in a financial crisis, or the models may not suggest appropriate management of long-term risks” and “should there be widespread use of opaque models, it would likely result in unintended consequences”.

With increased use of machine learning and AI, we are seeing the potential rise of self-driving investment vehicles. Using self-driving cars as a metaphor, Artemis Capital highlights that “the fatal flaw is that your driving algorithm has never seen a mountain road” and that “as machines trade with against each other, self-reflexivity is amplified”. Others point out that machine learning in trading may involve machine learning algorithms learning the behaviour of other machine learning algorithms, in a regressive loop, all drawing on the same data and the same methodology. 13D Research opined that “when algorithms coexist in complex systems with subjectivity and unpredictability of human behaviour, unforeseen and destabilising downsides result”.

It is said that there is nothing magical about quant strategies. Quantitative investing is an approach for implementing investment strategies in an automated (or semi-automated) way. The key seems to be data, its quality and its uniqueness. A hypothesis is developed and tested and tested again against various themes to identify anomalies or inefficiencies. Jim Simons of Renaissance Technologies (called RenTec), one of the oldest and most successful quant funds, said that the “efficient market theory is correct in that there are no gross inefficiencies” but “we look at anomalies that may be small in size and brief in time. We make our forecast. Then, shortly thereafter, we re-evaluate the situation and revise our forecast and our portfolio. We do this all-day long. We’re always in and out and out and in. So we’re dependent on activity to make money“. Simons emphasised that RenTec “don’t start with models” but “we start with data” and “we don’t have any preconceived notions”. They “look for things that can be replicated thousands of times”.

The recently departed co-CEO Robert Mercer of RenTec [yes the Mercer who backs Breitbart which adds a scary political Big Brother surveillance angle to this story] has said “RenTec gets a trillion bytes of data a day, from newspapers, AP wire, all the trades, quotes, weather reports, energy reports, government reports, all with the goal of trying to figure out what’s going to be the price of something or other at every point in the future… The information we have today is a garbled version of what the price is going to be next week. People don’t really grasp how noisy the market is. It’s very hard to find information, but it is there, and in some cases it’s been there for a long long time. It’s very close to science’s needle in a haystack problem

Kumesh Aroomoogan of Accern recently said that “quant hedge funds are buying as much data as they can”. The so-called “alternative data” market was worth about $200 million in the US in 2017 and is expected to double in four years, according to research and consulting firm Tabb Group. The explosion of data that has and is becoming available in this technological revolution should keep the quants busy, for a while.

However, what’s scaring me is that these incredibly clever people will inevitably end up farming through the same data sets, coming to broadly similar conclusions, and the machines who have learned each other’s secrets will all start heading for the exits at the same time, in real time, in a mother of all quant flash crashes. That sounds too much like science fiction to ever happen though, right?

QE effects and risks: McKinsey

McKinsey had an interesting report on the impact of QE and ultra low interest rates. There was nothing particularly earth shattering about what they said but the report has some interesting graphs and commentary on the risks of the current global monetary policies.

The main points highlighted included:

  • By the end of 2012, governments in the US, the UK, and the Eurozone had collectively benefited by $1.6 trillion (through reduced debt service costs and increased central bank profits) whilst households have lost $630 billion in net interest income (impacting those more dependent upon fixed income returns).
  • Non-financial companies across the US, the UK, and the Eurozone have benefited by $710 billion through lower debt service costs. This boosted corporate profits by about 5%, 3% and 3% for the US, UK and Eurozone respectively. The 5% US boost accounted for approx 25% of profit growth for US corporates.
  • Effective net interest margins for Eurozone banks have declined significantly and their cumulative loss of net interest income totalled $230 billion between 2007 and 2012. Banks in the US have experienced an increase in effective net interest margins by $150 billion as interest paid on deposits and other liabilities has declined more than interest received on loans and other assets. The experience of UK banks falls between these two extremes.
  • Life insurance companies, particularly in several European countries where guaranteed returns are the norm (e.g. Germany), are being squeezed by ultra-low interest rates. If the low interest-rate environment were to continue for several more years, many insurers who offered guaranteed returns would find their survival threatened.
  • The impact of ultra-low rate monetary policies on financial asset prices is ambiguous. Bond prices rise as interest rates decline and, between 2007 and 2012, the value of sovereign and corporate bonds in the US, the UK, and the Eurozone increased by $16 trillion.
  • Little conclusive evidence that ultra-low interest rates have boosted equity markets was found.
  • At the end of 2012, house prices may have been as much as 15 percent higher in the US and the UK than they otherwise would have been without ultra-low interest rates.

Some interesting graphs from the report are reproduced below:

click to enlargeCentral Bank Balance Sheets 2007 to Q2 2013

click to enlargeImpact of lower interest rates 2007 to 2012

 click to enlargeEffective Bank Margins 2007 to 2012

click to enlargeImplied Real Cost of Equity US 1964 to 2013

If the current low rate environment were to continue, McKinsey highlight European life insurers and banks as being under stress and believe that each will need to change their business models to survive. Defined-benefit pension schemes would be another area under continuing stress. A continuation of the search for yield for investors may lead to increased leverage (and we know how that ends!).

Increases in interest rate would have “important implications for different sectors in advanced economies and for the dynamics of the global capital market.” Not least, many working in investment firms and banks will never have experienced an era of increased rates in their careers to date! The first impact is likely to be an increase in volatility. Such volatility combined with market price reductions in interest sensitive assets may have an impact across the market and asset classes. McKinsey state that “a risk that volatility could prove to be a headwind for broader economic growth as households and corporations react to uncertainty by curtailing their spending on durable goods and capital investment.

click to enlargeS&P movement to tapering

The report highlight the average maturity on sovereign debt has lengthened with 5.4 years, 6.5 years, 6 years and 14.6 years for the US, Germany, Eurozone and the UK. Higher interest rates will obviously mean higher interest payments for governments. A 3% increase in US 10 year rates would mean $75 billion more in repayments or 23% higher than 2012. If, as seems likely, rates increase in the US first, the impact of capital outflows on other governments could be material, particularly in the Eurozone. A resulting Euro depreciation is highlighted (although I am not sure this would be too unwelcome currently in Europe).

click to enlargeImpact of 1% rate increase on household income

Mark to market losses on fixed income portfolios will follow. Some, such as many non-life insurers have purposely run a short asset:liability mismatch in anticipation of rates increasing. Others such as life insurers or banks may not be in such a fortunate position. Hopefully, the impact of improved economies which is assumed to have accommodated the rise in interest rates will solve all ills.