Tag Archives: liquidity

Nero fiddles

This week it’s Syria and Russia, last week it was China. Serious in their own right as these issues are, Donald Trump’s erratic approach to off the cuff policy development is exhausting markets. In the last 60 trading days, the S&P500 has had 9 days over 1% and 12 days below -1%. For above 0.5% and more than -0.5%, the number of days is 21 and 15 respectively! According to an off the record White House insider, “a decision or statement is made by the president, and then the principals come in and tell him we can’t do it” and “when that fails, we reverse engineer a policy process to match whatever the president said”.  We live in some messed up world!

As per this post, the mounting QE withdrawals by Central Banks is having its impact on increased volatility. Credit Suisse’s CEO, Tidjane Thiam, this week said, “the tensions are showing and it’s very hard to imagine where you can get out of a scenario of prolonged extraordinary measures without some kind of, I always use the word ‘trauma’”.

Fortune had an insightful article on the US debt issue last month where they concluded that something has to give. According to an Institute of International Finance report, global debt reached a record $237 trillion in 2017, more than 317% of global GDP with the developed world higher around 380%. According to the Monthly Treasury Statement just released, the US fiscal deficit is on track for the fiscal years (Q4 to Q3 of calendar year) 2018 and 2019 to be $833 billion and $984 billion compared to $666 billion in 2017.

This week also marks the publication of the Congressional Budget Office’s fiscal projections for the US after considering the impact of the Trump tax cuts. The graphs below from the report illustrate the impact they estimate, with the fiscal deficits higher by $1.5 trillion over 10 years. It’s important to note that these estimates assume a relatively benign economic environment over the next 10 years. No recession, for example, over the next 10 years, as assumed by the CBO, would mean a period of nearly 20 years without one! That’s not likely!

The first graph below shows some of the macro-economic assumptions in the CBO report, the second showing the aging profile in the US which determines participation rates in the economy and limits its potential, with the following graphs showing the fiscal estimates.

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The respected author Satyajit Das highlighted in this article how swelling levels of debt will amplify the effect of any rate rises, with higher rates having the following impacts:

  • Increase credit risk. LIBOR has already risen, as per this post, and large sways of corporate debt is driven by LIBOR. This post shows some of debt levels in S&P500 firms, as per the IMF Global Financial Stability report from last April and the graph below tells its own tale.
  • Generate large mark-to-market losses on existing debt holdings. A 1% increase is estimated to impact US government debt by $2 trillion globally.
  • Drive investors away from risky assets such as equity, decimating the now quaint so-called TINA trade (“there is no alternative”).
  • Divert cash to servicing debt, further dampening economic activity and business investment.
  • Restrict the ability of governments to deploy fiscal stimulus.

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Back in the land of Nero, or Trump in our story, his new talking head in chief, Larry Kudlow, recently said the White House would propose a “rescission bill” to strip out $120 billion from nondefense discretionary spending. Getting that one past either the Senate or the House ahead of the November midterm elections is fanciful and just not probable after the elections. So that’s what the Nero of our time is planning in response to our hypothetical Rome burning exasperated by his reckless fiscal policies (and hopefully there wouldn’t be any unjustified actual burning as a result of his ill thought out foreign policies over the coming days and weeks).

Size of notional CDS market from 2001 to 2012

Sometime during early 2007 I recall having a conversation with a friend who was fretting about the dangers behind the exponential growth in the unregulated credit default swap (CDS) market. His concerns centred on the explosion in rampant speculation in the market by way of “naked” CDS trades (as opposed to covered CDS where the purchaser has an interest in the underlying instrument). The notional CDS market size was then estimated to be considerably higher than the whole of the global bond market (sovereign, municipal, corporate, mortgage and ABS). At the time, I didn’t appreciate what the growth in the CDS market meant. Obviously, the financial crisis dramatically demonstrated the impact!

More recently the London Whale episode at JP Morgan has again highlighted the thin line between the use of CDS for hedging and for speculation. Last week I tried to find a graph that illustrated what had happened to the size of the notional CDS market since the crisis and had to dig through data from the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) to come up with the graph below.

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Size of notional CDS market 2001 to 2012

Comparing the size of the notional CDS market to the size of the bond market is a flawed metric as the notional CDS market figures are made up of buyers and sellers (in roughly equal measures) and many CDS can relate to the same underlying bond. Net CDS exposures are only estimated to be a few percent of the overall market today although that comparison ignores the not inconsiderable counterparty risk. Notwithstanding the validity of the comparison, the CDS market of $25 trillion as at the end of 2012 is still considerable compared to the approximate $100 trillion global bond market today. The dramatic changes in the size of both the CDS market (downward) and the bond market (upward) directly reflect the macroeconomic shifts as a result of the financial crisis.

The financial industry lobbied hard to ensure that CDS would not be treated as insurance under the Dodd-Frank reforms although standardized CDS are being moved to clearing houses under the regulations with approximately 10% of notional CDS being cleared in 2012 according to the ISDA. The other initiative to reduce systemic risk is portfolio compression exercises across the OTC swap market whereby existing trades are terminated and restructured in exchange for replacement trades with smaller notional sizes.

Although the industry argues that naked CDS increase the liquidity of the market and aid price discovery, there is mixed research on the topic from the academic world. In Europe, naked CDS on sovereign bonds was banned as a result of the volatility suffered by Greece during the Euro wobbles. The regulatory push of OTC markets to clearing houses does possibly raise new systemic risks associated with concentration of credit risk from clearing houses! Other unintended consequences of the Dodd Franks and Basel III regulatory changes is the futurization of swaps as outlined in Robert Litan’s fascinating article.

Anyway, before I say something silly on a subject I know little about, I just wanted to share the graph above. I had thought that the specialty insurance sector, particularly the property catastrophe reinsurers, may be suited for a variation on a capital structure arbitrage type trade, particularly when many such insurers are increasingly using sub-debt and hybrid instruments in their capital structures (with Solvency II likely to increase the trend) as a recent announcement by Twelve Capital illustrates. I wasn’t primarily focussed on a negative correlation type trade (e.g. long equity/short debt) but more as a way of hedging tail risk on particular natural catastrophe peak zones (e.g. by way of purchasing CDS on debt of a overexposed insurer to a particular zone). Unfortunately, CDS are not available on these mid sized firms (they are on the larger firms like Swiss and Munich Re) and even if they were they would not be available to a small time investor like me!