Tag Archives: low cost of capital

Befuddled Lloyd’s

Lloyd’s of London always provides a fascinating insight into the London insurance market and beyond into the global specialty insurance market, as this previous post shows. It’s Chairman, Bruce Carnegie-Brown, commented in their 2017 annual report that he expects “2018 to be another challenging year for Lloyd’s and the Corporation continues to refine its strategy to address evolving market conditions”. Given the bulking up of many of its competitors through M&A, Willis recently called it a reinvigoration of the “big balance sheet” reinsurance model, Lloyd’s needs to get busy sharpening its competitive edge. In a blunter message Brown stressed that “the market’s 2017 results are proof, if any were needed, that business as usual is not sustainable”.

A looked at the past 15 years of underwriting results gives an indicator of current market trends since the underwriting quality control unit, called the Franchise Board, was introduced at the end of 2002 after the disastrous 1990’s for the 330-year-old institution.

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The trend of increasing non-CAT loss ratios after years of soft pricing coupled with declining prior year reserve releases is clear to see. That increases the pressure on the insurance sector to control expenses. To that end, Inga Beale, Lloyd’s CEO, is pushing modernisation via the London Market Target Operating Model programme hard, stating that electronic placement will be mandated, on a phased basis, “to speed up the adoption of the market’s modernisation programme, which will digitise processes, reduce unsustainable expense ratios, and make Lloyd’s more attractive to do business with”.

The need to reduce expenses in Lloyd’s is acute given its expense ratio is around 40% compared to around 30% for most of its competitors. Management at Lloyd’s promised to “make it cheaper and easier to write business at Lloyd’s, enabling profitable growth”. Although Lloyd’s has doubled its gross premium volumes over the past 15 years, the results over varying timeframes below, particularly the reducing underwriting margins, show the importance of stressing profitable growth and expense efficiencies for the future.

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A peer comparison of Lloyd’s results over the past 15 years illustrates further the need for the market to modernise, as below. Although the 2017 combined ratio for some of the peer groupings have yet to finalised and published (I will update the graph when they do so), the comparison indicates that Lloyd’s has been doing worse than its reinsurance and Bermudian peers in recent years. It is suspicious to see, along with the big reinsurers and Bermudians, Lloyd’s included Allianz, CNA, and Zurich (and excluded Mapfe) in their competitor group from 2017. If you can’t meet your target, just change the metric behind the target!

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A recent report from Aon Benfield shows the breakdown of the combined ratio for their peer portfolio of specialist insurers and reinsurers from 2006 to 2017, as below.

click to enlargeAon Benfield Aggregate Combined Ratio 2006 to 2017

So, besides strong competitors, increasing loss ratios and heavy expense loads, what does Lloyd’s have to worry about? Well, in common with many, Lloyd’s must contend with structural changes across the industry as a result of, in what Willis calls in their latest report, “the oversupply of capital” from investors in insurance linked securities (ILS) with a lower cost of capital, whereby the 2017 insured losses appears to have had “no impact upon appetite”, according to Willis.

I have posted many times, most recently here, on the impact ILS has had on property catastrophe pricing. The graph of the average multiple of coupon to expected loss on deals monitored by sector expert Artemis again illustrates the pricing trend. I have come up with another angle to tell the story, as per the graph below. I compared the Guy Carpenter rate on line (ROL) index for each year against an index of the annual change in the rolling 10-year average global catastrophe insured loss (which now stands at $66 billion for 2008-2017). Although it is somewhat unfair to compare a relative measure (the GC ROL index) against an absolute measure (change in average insured loss), it makes a point about the downward trend in property catastrophe reinsurance pricing in recent years, particularly when compared to the trend in catastrophic losses. To add potentially to the unfairness, I also included the rising volumes in the ILS sector, in an unsubtle finger point.

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Hilary Weaver, Lloyd’s CRO, recognises the danger and recently commented that “the new UK ILS regulation will, if anything, increase the already abundant supply of insurance capital” and “this is likely to mean that prices remain low for many risks, so we need to remain vigilant to ensure that the prices charged for them are proportionate to the risk”.

The impact extends beyond soft pricing and could impact Lloyd’s risk profile. The loss of high margin (albeit not as high as it once was) and low frequency/high severity business means that Lloyd’s will have to fish in an already crowded pond for less profitable and less volatile business. The combined ratios of Lloyd’s main business lines are shown below illustrating that all, except casualty, have had a rough 2017 amid competitive pressures and large losses.

As reinsurance business is commoditised further by ILS, in a prelude to an increase in machine/algorithm underwriting, Lloyd’s business will become less volatile and as a result less profitable. To illustrate, the lower graph below shows Lloyd’s historical weighted average combined ratio, using the 2017 business mix, versus the weighted average combined ratio excluding the reinsurance line. For 2003 to 2017, the result would be an increase in average combined ratio, from 95.8% to 96.5%, and a reduction in volatility, the standard deviation from 9.7% to 7%.

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To write off Lloyd’s however would be a big mistake. In my view, there remains an important role for a specialist marketplace for heterogeneous risks, where diverse underwriting expertise cannot be easily replicated by machines. Lloyd’s has shown its ability in the past to evolve and adapt, unfortunately however usually when it doesn’t have any choice. Hopefully, this legendary 330-year-old institution will get ahead of the game and dictate its own future. It will be interesting to watch.

 

Epilogue – Although this analogy has limitations, it occurs to me that the insurance sector is at a stage of evolution that the betting sector was at about a decade ago (my latest post on the sector is here). Traditional insurers, with over-sized expenses, operate like old traditional betting shops with paper slips and manual operations. The onset of online betting fundamentally changed the way business is transacted and, as a result, the structure of the industry. The upcoming digitalisation of the traditional insurance business will radically change the cost structure of the industry. Lloyd’s should look to the example of Betfair (see an old post on Betfair for more) as a means of digitalising the market platform and radically reducing costs.

Follow-on 28th April – Many thanks to Adam at InsuranceLinked for re-posting this post. A big welcome to new readers, I hope you will stick around and check out some other posts from this blog. I just came across this report from Oliver Wyam on the underwriter of the future that’s worth a read. They state that the “commercial and wholesale insurance marketplaces are undergoing radical change” and they “expect that today’s low-price environment will continue for the foreseeable future, continuing to put major pressure on cost“.

Thoughts on ILS Pricing

Valuations in the specialty insurance and reinsurance sector have been given a bump up with all of the M&A activity and the on-going speculation about who will be next. The Artemis website reported this week that Deutsche Bank believe the market is not differentiating enough between firms and that even with a lower cost of capital some are over-valued, particularly when lower market prices and the relaxation in terms and conditions are taken into account. Although subject to hyperbole, industry veteran John Charman now running Endurance, stated in a recent interview that market conditions in reinsurance are the most “brutal” he has seen in his 44 year career.

One interesting development is the re-emergence of Richard Brindle with a new hybrid hedge fund type $2 billion firm, as per this Bloomberg article. Given the money Brindle made out of Lancashire, I am surprised that he is coming back with a business plan that looks more like a jump onto the convergence hedge fund reinsurer band wagon than anything more substantive given current market conditions. Maybe he has nothing to lose and is bored! It will be interesting to see how that one develops.

There have been noises coming out of the market that insurance linked securities (ILS) pricing has reached a floor. Given that the Florida wind exposure is ground zero for the ILS market, I had a look through some of the deals on the Artemis website, to see what pricing was like. The graph below does only have a small number of data points covering different deal structures so any conclusions have to be tempered. Nonetheless, it does suggest that rate reductions are at least slowing in 2015.

click to enlargeFlorida ILS Pricing

Any review of ILS pricing, particularly for US wind perils, should be seen in the context of a run of low storm recent activity in the US for category 3 or above. In their Q3-2014 call, Renaissance Re commented (as Eddie pointed out in the comments to this post) that the probability of a category 3 or above not making landfall in the past 9 years is statistically at a level below 1%. The graph below shows some wind and earthquake pricing by vintage (the quake deals tend to be the lower priced ones).

click to enlargeWind & Quake ILS Pricing by year

This graph does suggest that a floor has been reached but doesn’t exactly inspire any massive confidence that pricing in recent deals is any more adequate than that achieved in 2014.

From looking through the statistics on the Artemis website, I thought that a comparison to corporate bond spreads would be interesting. In general (and again generalities temper the validity of conclusions), ILS public catastrophe bonds are rated around BB so I compared the historical spreads of BB corporate against the average ILS spreads, as per the graph below.

click to enlargeILS Spreads vrs BB Corporate Spread

The graph shows that the spreads are moving in the same direction in the current environment. Of course, it’s important to remember that the price of risk is cheap across many asset classes as a direct result of the current monetary policy across the developed world of stimulating economic activity through encouraging risk taking.

Comparing spreads in themselves has its limitation as the underlying exposure in the deals is also changing. Artemis uses a metric for ILS that divides the spread by the expected loss, referred to herein as the ILS multiple. The expected loss in ILS deals is based upon the catastrophe modeller’s catalogue of hurricane and earthquake events which are closely aligned to the historical data of known events. To get a similar statistic to the ILS multiple for corporate bonds, I divided the BB spreads by the 20 year average of historical default rates from 1995 to 2014 for BB corporate risks. The historical multiples are in the graph below.

click to enlargeILS vrs BB Corporate Multiples

Accepting that any conclusions from the graph above needs to consider the assumptions made and their limitations, the trends in multiples suggests that investors risk appetite in the ILS space is now more aggressive than that in the corporate bond space. Now that’s a frightening thought.

Cheap risk premia never ends well and no fancy new hybrid business model can get around that reality.

Follow-up: Lane Financial LLC has a sector report out with some interesting statistics. One comment that catch my eye is that they estimate a well spread portfolio by a property catastrophic reinsurer who holds capital at a 1-in-100 and a 1-in-250 level would only achieve a ROE of 8% and 6.8% respectively at todays ILS prices compared to a ROE of 18% and 13.3% in 2012. They question “the sustainability of the independent catastrophe reinsurer” in this pricing environment and offer it as an explanation “why we have begun to see mergers and acquisitions, not between two pure catastrophe reinsurers but with cat writers partnering with multi-lines writers“.