Category Archives: Insurance Firms

Oh AIG, where art thou?

In my last post on AIG, I expressed my doubts about the P&C targets outlined in their plan. After first announcing a $20 billion retroactive reinsurance deal with Berkshire covering long tail commercial P&C reserves for accident years prior to 2015 in January, AIG just announced another large commercial lines reserve charge of $5.6 billion principally from their US business. The graph below shows the impact upon their 2016 pre-tax operating income.

click to enlargeaig-pretax-operating-income-2012-to-2016

The latest reserve hit amounts to 12% of net commercial reserves at end Q3 2016 and compares to 7%, 8% and 6% for previous 2015, 2010, and 2009 commercial reserve charges. Whereas previously reserve strengthening related primarily to excess casualty and workers compensation (WC) business (plus an asbestos charge in 2010), this charge also covers primary casualty and WC business. The accident year vintage of the releases is also worryingly immature, as the graph below shows. After the 2016 charge, AIG have approx $7 billion of cover left on the Berkshire coverage.

click to enlargeaig-reserve-strengthening-accident-year-distribution

Although AIG have yet again made adjustments to business classifications, the graph below shows near enough the development of the accident year loss ratios on the commercial book over recent times.

click to enlargeaig-commercial-pc-accident-year-loss-ratios-2011-to-2016

It is understandable that AIG missed their aggressive target against the pricing background of the past few years as illustrated by the latest Marsh report, as the exhibits below on global commercial rates and the US and European subsets show.

click to enlargeglobal-insurance-market-index

click to enlargeus-europe-insurance-market-index

All of these factors would make me very skeptical on the targeted 62% exit run rate for the 2017 accident year loss ratio on the commercial book. And no big reinsurance deal with Berkshire (or with Swiss Re for that matter) or $5 billion of share buybacks (AIG shares outstanding is down nearly a third since the beginning of 2014 due to buybacks whilst the share price is up roughly 25% over that period), can impact the reality which AIG has now to achieve. No small ask.

Some may argue that AIG have kitchen-sinked the reserves to make the target of accident year loss ratios in the low 60’s more achievable. I hope for the firm’s sake that turns out to be true (against the odds). The alternative may be more disposals of profitable (life) businesses, possibly eventually leading to a sale of the rump and maybe the disappearance of AIG altogether.

A Tale of Two Insurers

My negativity on the operating prospects for the reinsurance and specialty insurance sector has been articulated many times previously in this blog. Many of the same factors are impacting the broader commercial insurance market. Pricing conditions in the US and globally can be seen in the graph below.

click to enlargeUS and Global Commercial Insurance Pricing

Two insurers, at different ends of the size scale, which I have previously posted on, are AIG (more recently here and here) and Lancashire (more recently here and here). Given that a lot has happened to each since I last posted on them, I thought a quick update on both would give an interesting insight into the current market.

First up is AIG who have been under a lot of pressure from shareholders to unlock value, including a break-up plan for the insurance giant from the opportunistic rascal Carl Icahn. The graph below shows a breakdown of recent operating results (as ever with AIG longer term comparisons are hampered by their ever changing reporting segments). The improvement in the UGC mortgage insurance business has been dwarfed by the poor non-life results which were impacted by a significant reserve strengthening charge.

click to enlargeAIG PreTax Operating Income 2012 to 2015

In January, Peter Hancock (the 5th CEO since Hank Greenberg left in 2005) announced a new strategic plan to the end of 2017, the main points of which are

  • Return at least $25 billion of capital to shareholders through dividends and share buy-backs from operating profits, divestitures and other actions such as monetizing future life profits by $4-5 billion through reinsurance purchases.
  • Enhance transparency by separating into an operating portfolio with a goal of over 10% return on equity and a legacy portfolio that will focus on return of capital. Reorganize into at least nine modular, more self-contained business units to enhance accountability, transparency, and strategic flexibility.
  • Reduce general operating expenses by $1.6 billion, 14 percent of the 2015 expenses.
  • Improve the commercial P&C accident year loss ratio by six points.
  • Pursue an active divestiture program, including initially the 20% IPO of UGC.

The non-life reserve charge in 2015 amounted to $3.6 billion. 60% of the charge came from the (mainly US) casualty business, 16% from financial lines (again mainly in the US) and 15% from the run-off business. After the last material reserve strengthening in 2010, the worrying aspect of the 2015 charge is that approximately two thirds comes from accident years not yet 10 years old (which is relatively immature for long tail casualty business particularly when 42% of the charge is on excess casualty business). The impact of the reserve hikes on the commercial P&C segment can be clearly seen in the graph below.

click to enlargeAIG Commercial P&C Combined Ratio Breakdown 2008 to 2015

Perhaps the most aggressive target, given current market conditions, in the strategic plan is the 6% improvement in the commercial P&C accident year loss ratio by the end of 2017. The plan includes exiting approximately $1 billion of US casualty business, including poorly performing excess casualty business, primary and excess auto liability, health-care and financial lines business. Growth of $0.5 billion is been targeted in multi-national, financial lines, property upper middle market and major accounts which involve specialist engineering capabilities, international casualty and emerging risks such as cyber and M&A insurance. AIG also recently announced a two year reinsurance deal with Swiss Re on their US casualty book (it looks like a 25% quota share). The scale of the task for AIG in meeting this target can be seen in the exhibit below which takes a number of slides from the strategy presentation.

click to enlargeAIG Commercial P&C Metrics

I was struck by a quote from the firm on their turnaround plan – “We will use the data and analytical tools we have invested in to significantly differentiate and determine where we should focus our resources.” I suspect that every significant insurer would claim to have, or at least aspire to have, similar analytical capabilities. Big data and analytical driven underwriting is undoubtedly the future for large insurers with access to large amounts of quality data. Fortune had an interesting recent article on the analytical firm Palantir who are working with some insurers on sharpening their underwriting criteria for the social media age. An analyst in Citi even suggested that Goggle should look at buying AIG as a fintech play. The entry of the big internet firms into the insurance sector seems inevitable in some form or other, although I doubt AIG will be part of any such strategy.

As to the benefits of staying a large composite insurer, AIG cited an analysis commissioned by consultants Oliver Wyman supporting the benefits of diversification between the life and non-life business of AIG. Using the S&P consolidated model as a proxy, Oliver Wyman estimate a $7.5 billion capital benefit to AIG compared to separate life and non-life businesses, as envisaged in Icahn’s plan.

So, can AIG achieve the aggressive operational targets they have set themselves for the P&C business? Current market conditions present a considerable challenge. Combined with their recent results, an end of 2017 target for a 6% improvement is extremely aggressive. Too aggressive for my liking. However, the P&C results should improve somewhat over the short term (particularly if there is no more big reserve charges) and actions such as expense reductions, monetizing future life profits and divestitures will give AIG the fire power to hand out sweeties to shareholders. For those willing to take the punt, the return of a chunk of the $25 billion target in dividends and share buy-backs over the next 2 years for a firm with a current market value of $61 billion, trading at a 0.72 multiple to book value (trading around 0.92 of book less AOCI and DTA), may be too tempting to resist. It does have a certain allure…..

Lancashire, a London market specialty insurer and reinsurer with a mantra of disciplined underwriting, is at the opposite end of the scale spectrum with a niche focus. Long cherished by investors for its shareholder friendly dividend policies, Lancashire has been under pressure of late due to the heavy competition in its niche markets. The energy insurance sector, for example, has been described by the broker Willis as dismal with capacity chasing a smaller premium pool due to the turmoil in the oil market. A number of recent articles (such as here and here) highlight the dangers. Alex Maloney, the firm’s CEO, described the current market as “one of the most difficult trading environments during the last twenty years”. In addition, Lancashire lost its founder, Richard Brindle, in 2014 plus the CEO, the CFO and some senior underwriters of its Lloyds’ Cathedral unit in 2015.

The graph below shows the breakdown of reported historical calendar year combined ratios plus the latest accident year net loss ratio and paid ratio.

click to enlargeLancashire Ratio Breakdown 2008 to 2015

The underwriting discipline that Lancashire professes can be seen in the recent accident year loss ratios and in the 30% drop in gross written premiums (GWP), as per the graph below. The drop is more marked in net written premiums at 35% due to the increase in reinsurance spend to 25% of GWP (from approx 10% in its early years).

click to enlargeLancashire GWP Breakdown 2008 to 2015

The timely and astute increase in reinsurance protection spend can be seen in the decrease in their peak US aggregate exposures. The latest probable maximum loss (PML) estimates for their US peak exposures are approximately $200 million compared to historical levels of $300-350 million. Given the lower net premium base, the PML figures in loss ratio terms have only dropped to 40% from 50-60% historically. Lancashire summed up their reinsurance purchasing strategy as follows:

“Our outwards reinsurance programme provides a breadth and depth of cover which has helped us to strengthen our position and manage volatility. This helps us to continue to underwrite our core portfolio through the challenges posed by the cycle.”

As with AIG, the temptation for shareholders is that Lancashire will continue with their generous dividends, as the exhibit below from their Q4 2015 presentation shows.

click to enlargeLancashire Dividend History 2015

The other attraction of Lancashire is that it may become a take-over target. It currently trades at 1.4 times tangible book level which is rich compared to its US and Bermudian competitors but low compared to its peers in Lloyds’ which trade between 1.58 and 2.0 times tangible book. Lancashire itself included the exhibit below on tangible book values in its Q4 2015 presentation.

click to enlargeInsurance Tangible Book Value Multiple 2012 to 2015

It is noteworthy that there has been little activity on the insurance M&A front since the eye boggling multiples achieved by Amlin and HCC from their diversification hungry Japanese purchasers. Many in the market thought the valuations signaled the top of the M&A frenzy.

Relatively, AIG looks more attractive than Lancashire in terms of the potential for shareholder returns. However, fundamentally I cannot get away from current market conditions. Risk premia is just too low in this sector and no amount of tempting upside through dividends, buy-backs or M&A multiples can get me comfortable with the downside potential that comes with this market. As per the sentiment expressed in previous posts, I am happy with zero investment exposure to the insurance sector right now. I will watch this one play out from the sidelines.

Hot Take-outs

In many episodes of fervent investment activity within a particular hot spot, like the current insurance M&A party, there is a point where you think “really?”. The deal by Mitsui Sumitomo to take over Amlin at 2.4 times tangible book is one such moment. A takeover of Amlin was predicted by analysts, as per this post, so that’s no surprise but the price is.

With the usual caveat on the need to be careful when comparing multiples for US, Bermuda, London and European insurers given the different accounting standards, the graph below from a December post, shows the historical tangible book value levels and the improving multiples being applied by the market to London firms such as Amlin.

click to enlargeHistorical Tangible Book Multiples for Reinsurers & Specialty Insurers

Comparable multiples from recent deals, as per the graph below, show the high multiple of the Mitsui/Amlin deal. Amlin has a 10 year average ROE around 20% but a more realistic measure is the recent 5 year average of 11%. In today’s market, the short to medium term ROE expectation is likely to be in the high single digits. Even at 10%, the 2.4 multiple looks aggressive.

click to enlargeM&A Tangible Book Multiples September 2015

There is little doubt that the insurance M&A party will continue and that the multiples may be racy. In the London market, the remaining independent players are getting valued as such, as per the graph below tracking valuations at points in time.

click to enlargeLondon Specialty Insurers Tangible Book Values

When the hangover comes, a 2.4 multiple will look even sillier than its does now at this point in the pricing cycle. In the meantime, its party like 1999 time!

Lancashire finds the love

After going ex-dividend in November, investors went mega bearish on Lancashire (LRE.L) when it nearly dropped below the 500p level, as the graph below shows. A previous post highlighted the reasons behind the change in sentiment over the first half of 2014 on the once darling of the specialty insurance sector.

click to enlargeLancashire Insurance Group 2014 Share Price

The firm released its Q4 today and announced another special dividend of $0.50 on top of the regular $0.10 dividend. Driven by stable results, as per the graph below, and by the chatter that Lancashire could be an M&A target, the price today reflects a respectable 160% multiple to diluted tangible book. It was odd that although the firm’s executives joked about having prepared an answer to the M&A question, no analyst actually asked the question in the conference call today!

click to enlargeLancashire Historical Combined Loss 2008 to 2014

One of the big positives from the call today was the news that the firm has restructured their reinsurance programme that protects their book to give them more event coverage with reinstatements (away from previous aggregate cover). This provides more protection to Lancashire from multiple events. The PMLs as at January expressed as a percentage of the calendar year earned premiums (estimated figures for 2015) show the reduced net risk profile of this arbitrage strategy.

click to enlargeLancashire PMLs January 2015

It’s nice to see Lancashire recover some of its shine and it will be intriguing to see if it does become an M&A target in the coming months.

Updated Insurance Multiples

It has been a while since I looked at net tangible asset multiples for reinsurers and selected specialty insurers (the last such post is here). Motivated by the collapse in Lancashire’s multiple (briefly mentioned in a previous post) since they went ex-dividend, I redid the tangible book multiple figures. Previously I have used average operating ROEs as the x-axis but this time I have used annualized total returns since year-end 2010 (to capture the 2011 catastrophe year with the recent results of the past 3 years). Annualized total returns are made up of tangible book growth and dividends paid in 2011 to today. The split between tangible book growth and dividends, on an annualized basis across the past 4 years, for each firm as per the graph below (when calculating tangible book values, as is my usual practise disclosed previously, I excluded all goodwill and intangibles, except for the present value of future profits (PVFP) for life reinsurance business for European reinsurers).

click to enlargeReinsurers & Specialty Insurer Total Return December 2014

The graph of tangible book multiples to annualized returns is below. [Note – although insurance accounting has converged somewhat in recent years, caution still needs to be taken when comparing UK, European, and Bermudian/US firms due to the differing accounting regimes under which results are reported].

click to enlargeReinsurers & Specialty Insurers NTA Multiples December 2014

I split the firms into different colours – green is for the Bermudian & US firms, red is for London market firms, and blue is for the European composite reinsurers. In terms of who else may get involved in M&A following the Renaissance/Platinum deal, its interesting to see most of the Bermudians bunched up so close to each other in valuation and return profiles. The higher valued and larger firms may be the instigators in taking over smaller competitors but it looks more likely that medium sized firms need to get with today’s realities and seek tie-ups together. Who will wait it out in the hope of some market changing event or who will get it together in 2015 will be fascinating to watch!!

Follow-on: To get an idea of historical changes in the tangible book multiples in the three groupings above, the graph below shows the trends. The multiples in each year are simple averages across the firms (and not all are at the same point in the year) but the graph nonetheless gives an idea of changing market sentiment. Although the London and European firms are a smaller sample than the Bermudian/US firms, the graph indicates that the market is confident that the underwriting indiscipline of years past have been overcome in the London market, thus justifying a premium multiple. Time will tell on that score…..

click to enlargeHistorical Tangible Book Multiples for Reinsurers & Specialty Insurers