Tag Archives: internet of things

CenturyLink levelled

It’s been over 6 months since I last posted on the upcoming merger of Level 3 (LVLT) and Centurylink (CTL). Since then, LVLT’s CEO Jeff Storey has been named COO of the combined entity and CEO from January 2019, after a gentle push from activist investor Keith Meister of Corvex Management (here is an article on their latest position), effectively meaning the merger is an operational LVLT takeover of CTL. In June, CTL also got hit by a lawsuit from an ex-employer alleging a high-pressure sales culture which ripped customers off (an avalanche of class action suits followed). And, potentially more damaging, the recent results of CTL continue to point to deteriorating trends in the legacy part of their business and lackluster growth on the strategic part of the business. CTL missed their quarterly estimates again in the most recent quarter, the third miss in a row.

Picking up on my recent telecom industry post, the sector will struggle in the short term to find top line growth before the full impact of new “digital lifestyle” opportunities emerge. The figures below for enterprise, including public sector, and wholesale revenues for some of the biggest US players (which have been adjusted judgmentally for items such as the impact of the XO acquisition on Verizon’s revenues and the ever-changing classifications and reclassifications that telecom’s love) illustrate the current struggle in getting newer IP enabled services to fully compensate for declining legacy revenues.

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These figures imply average quarterly declines since 2014 of -0.3% and -1.2% for enterprise and wholesale business respectively. However, the trend has been getting worse. The average quarterly change was 0.2% and -1.1% for enterprise and wholesale business respectively from 2014 to 2015. Since 2016, the average quarterly change is -0.9% and -1.3% for enterprise and wholesale respectively. Not exactly a cheery trend when contemplating the prospects of a merged CTL/LVLT!

As can be seen below, the share price of LVLT and deal implied price have converged, particularly as CTL’s dividends get paid, albeit with a sharply downward bias in recent weeks over worries about dividend sustainability, valuation, sector trends, lawsuits and uncertainty over the closing date of the merger (a delay by California, the last State approval needed, may mean the end of September deadline is missed).

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My estimates for a standalone LVLT compared to analyst figures and those presented by LVLT management in the S4 (figures presented for merger negotiations are generally on the optimistic side) are below. Even factoring in higher interest rates (about 40% of LVLT’s debt is floating) over the coming years, I am comfortable with a standalone share price around the current mid-50’s, in the unlikely event the merger falls apart.

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To recap on my confidence in the ability of LVLT’s current management team to deliver, the results of the last merger between LVLT and TWTC show that management delivered a 40% uplift in the amount of free cashflow (e.g. EBITDA less capex) on flat revenues from 2014 to 2017 (e.g. combined FCF of both entities in the year prior to the merger to actual H1 results and my estimates for H2 2017). Some of my many previous posts on LVLT are here, here and here. Such a repeat in FCF in the CLT/LVLT merger is not a realistic expectation given the larger scale and different business mix, as the analysis below illustrates. Of course, the flat revenues over the past 3 years is a key concern (but worthy of praise given the industry trends highlighted above) and one of the catalysts for the CLT deal. Also, the health of designate CEO Jeff Storey may also be a factor over the next few years given his heart issues a few year ago.

My knowledge of CTL’s business is not as deep as that of LVLT’s and my confidence in their prospects on a standalone basis is nowhere near as lofty. My projections, split over a conservative base scenario and a more conservative low business scenario, can be seen below. My projections are primarily based upon the more recent trends in their business lines across their legacy and strategic enterprise and consumer businesses. The vast variance in my estimates, based upon recent trends, and those presented by management in the S4 (again, acknowledging that these are generally optimistic) illustrates why the market has lost such confidence in the outgoing management team at CTL, in my opinion.

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In terms of trying to model the merged CTL/LVLT, I have assumed the deal closes by the end of 2017 with 2018 being the first year of the merged entity. I have made a number of judgmental adjustments in my model, including assuming some loss of revenue due to the merger and cost reductions above published target synergies (e.g. $1 billion of operating synergies by end 2020 and $150 million of capex synergies by end 2019, higher than the announced target savings of $850 million and $125 million for opex and capex respectively). I have taken analyst estimates as an optimistic case (in CTL’s case I have taken their EBITDA estimates but still can’t get anywhere near their revenue figures) and called it the high scenario. My two projections above are used for the base and low scenarios. The resulting operating metrics for each scenario is shown below.

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The high scenario shows revenues flat-lining slightly above $24 billion for 2018 and 2019 with top-line growth returning in 2020 (YoY above 2.5%). EBITDA margins hit 40% by 2019 and remain stable around 40% thereafter. Capex is assumed to hit 15.5% of revenues by 2019 and remain at that percentage thereafter. This scenario assumes that management will be able to generate an approximate 30% uplift in the amount of free cashflow (e.g. EBITDA less capex) from 2017 (e.g. combined FCF of both entities in the year prior to the merger) to FY 2020.

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The base scenario shows revenues flat-lining around $23.5 billion for 2018 through 2020 with top-line growth returning in 2021 (YoY just below 2%). EBITDA margins hit 40% by 2019 and slowly trend down toward 39% thereafter. Capex is again assumed to hit 15.5% of revenues by 2019 and remain at that percentage thereafter. This scenario assumes that management will be able to generate an approximate 22% uplift in the amount of free cashflow (e.g. EBITDA less capex) from 2017 (e.g. combined FCF of both entities in the year prior to the merger) to FY 2020.

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The low scenario shows revenues around $23.5 billion for 2018 and drifting down to $23 billion before slowly hitting $23.5 billion again by 2022. Thereafter revenue growth builds slowly from 1.5% to 2.5% by 2027. EBITDA margins hit 39.5% by 2019 and slowly trend down toward 38.5% thereafter. Capex is again assumed to hit 15.5% of revenues by 2019 and remain at that percentage thereafter. This scenario assumes that management will be able to generate an approximate 18% uplift in the amount of free cashflow (e.g. EBITDA less capex) from 2017 (e.g. combined FCF of both entities in the year prior to the merger) to FY 2020.

I also assume the merged entity will carry $38 billion of debt from the offset (resulting from merger expenses, the cash payout to LVLT shareholders, and existing debts from both firms, after factoring any proceeds from recent CTL divestitures). I estimate that only 30% of this debt load is subject to a floating rate. In all scenarios, I assume the LIBOR rate linked to the floating rate increases incrementally by 275 basis points over the next 3 years (the current 12 month US rate is about 175 basis points). With a net debt to EBITDA ratio of approximately 3.8 at the end of 2018 across all scenarios, I believe that getting that ratio below 3 within 4 years by 2021, at the latest, will be a primary objective of the new management team. That would only be prudent in my view given the likely tightening monetary environment over the next few years which will punish valuations of corporates with high debt levels. Also, management will want to remain flexible if higher capex is needed to compete in new technologies for the IoT and digital lifestyle era (see recent sector post). I haven’t factored in an upside from LVLT’s CFO Sunit Patel proven ability to actively manage debt rates and maturities (his ability is highlighted by the fact that LVLT’s fixed debt costs 5.5% compared to CTL’s admittingly much larger fixed debt costing 6.8%)

That leads to the thorny question of the sustainability of the annual dividend of $2.16 per share (particularly given that share count will double, amounting to $2.3 billion per year). Under the high scenario, maintaining the current dividend and getting the net debt multiple below 3 by 2021 is doable if a little tight (primarily due to the cashflow benefits of LVLT’s NOLs). For both of the base and low scenarios maintaining the current dividend level is not realistic in my view, with a cut in the dividend to $1.30 and $1.00 needed in each scenario respectively (a 40% and a 55% cut). The current dividend yield on CTL is over 10%. Each of the cuts above would reduce that yield to approximately 6% and 5% for the base and low scenarios respectively based upon the current share price. Addressing the uncertainty over the dividend should be one of the priorities of the new management (and may even result in Jeff Storey’s move to the CEO position ahead of the planned January 2019 date).

Finally, before I reveal my per share valuations, I haven’t given any consideration to the financial impact of the current legal cases on alleged aggressive sales tactics as the level of current detail makes any such estimate impossible. Some of the class action cases claim anything from $600 million to $12 billion but these claims are always bloated and the eventual settlement figure, if there even is one, are often for a lot less than that claimed. Nor have I considered the potential impact of a spin-off of the consumer business (that’s for another time!).

So, based upon the analysis outlined in this post and using a discount rate of 8.5%, my valuation estimates for each of the three scenarios are below.

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The market’s current valuation of CTL around $20 indicates scenario 3 as the current expectation. This emphasizes the need to address the uncertainty over future dividend levels and the validity of the legal cases. Uncertainty over the closing date of the deal is overblown, in my view, and a few months of delay will not prove material. I do think the current valuation is harsh, given the potential upsides from the deal and longer-term industry trends. Interestingly, my base scenario valuation of £31 is not too far off the value of $34.75 by BofA Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley in the S4 (see this post on the S4). The base scenario is the one I would have the most confidence in, based upon my current knowledge, rather than the high scenario of $43 which does look too optimistic to me given current market trends.

I was never going to reinvest the cash component of the deal for LVLT shareholders given my current reservations about market valuations and move to cash across my portfolio. The analysis presented in this post indicates to me that the CTL shares due from the deal for LVLT shareholders are worth holding from a valuation perspective. For now.

For new investors, I’d wait to see how some of the uncertainties play out, particularly the dividend issue.

Telecoms’ troubles

The telecom industry is in a funk. S&P recently said that their “global 2017 base-case forecast is for flat revenues” and other analysts are predicting little growth in traditional telecom’s top line over the coming years across most developed markets. This recent post shows that wireless revenue by the largest US firms has basically flatlined with growth of only 1% from 2015 to 2016. Cord cutting in favour of wireless has long been a feature of incumbent wireline firms but now wireless carrier’s lunch is increasingly being eaten by disruptive new players such as Facebook’s messenger, Apple’s FaceTime, Googles’ Hangouts, Skype, Tencent’s QQ or WeChat, and WhatsApp. These competitors are called over the top (OTT) providers and they use IP networks to provide communications (e.g. voice & SMS), content (e.g. video) and cloud-based (e.g. compute and storage) offerings. The telecom industry is walking a fine line between enabling these competitors whilst protecting their traditional businesses.

The graph below from a recent TeleGeography report provides an illustration of what has happened in the international long-distance business.

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A recent McKinsey article predicts that in an aggressive scenario the share of messaging, fixed voice, and mobile voice revenue provided by OTT players could be within the ranges as per the graph below by 2018.

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Before the rapid rise of the OTT player, it was expected that telecoms could recover the loss of revenue from traditional services through increased data traffic over IP networks. Global IP traffic has exploded from 26 exabytes per annum in 2005 to 1.2 zettabytes in 2016 and is projected to grow, by the latest Cisco estimates here, at a CAGR of 24% to 2012. See this previous post on the ever-expanding metrics used for IP traffic (for reference, gigabyte/terabyte/petabyte/exabyte/zettabyte/yottabyte is a kilobyte to the power of 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 respectively).

According to the 2017 OTT Video Services Study conducted by Level 3 Communications, viewership of OTT video services, including Netflix, Hulu and Amazon Prime, will overtake traditional broadcast TV within the next five years, impacting cable firms and traditional telecom’s TV services alike. With OTT players eating telecom’s lunch, Ovum estimate a drop in spending on traditional communication services by a third over the next ten years.

Telecom and cable operators have long complained of unfair treatment given their investments in upgrading networks to handle the vast increase in data created by the very OTT players that are cannibalizing their revenue. For example, Netflix is estimated to consume as much as a third of total network bandwidth in the U.S. during peak times. Notwithstanding their growth, it’s important to see these OTT players as customers of the traditional telecoms as well as competitors and increasingly telecoms are coming to understand that they need to change and digitalise their business models to embrace new opportunities. The graphic below, not to scale, on changing usage trends illustrates the changing demands for telecoms as we enter the so called “digital lifestyle era”.

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The hype around the internet of things (IoT) is getting deafening. Just last week, IDC predicted that “by 2021, global IoT spending is expected to total nearly $1.4 trillion as organizations continue to invest in the hardware, software, services, and connectivity that enable the IoT”.

Bain & Co argue strongly in this article in February that telecoms, particularly those who have taken digital transformation seriously in their own operating models, are “uniquely qualified to facilitate the delivery of IoT solutions”. The reasons cited include their experience of delivering scale connectivity solutions, of managing extensive directories and the life cycles of millions of devices, and their strong position developing and managing analytics at the edge of the network across a range of industries and uses.

Upgrading network to 5G is seen as being necessary to enable the IoT age and the hype around 5G has increased along with the IoT hype and the growth in the smartphone ecosystem. But 5G is in a development stage and technological standards need to be finalised. S&P commented that “we don’t expect large scale commercial 5G rollout until 2020”.

So what can telecoms do in the interim about declining fundamentals? The answer is for telecoms to rationalise and digitalize their business. A recent McKinsey IT benchmarking study of 80 telecom companies worldwide found that top performers had removed redundant platforms, automated core processes, and consolidated overlapping capabilities. New technologies such as software-defined networks (SDN) and network-function virtualization (NFV) mean telecoms can radically reshape their operating models. Analytics can be used to determine smarter capital spending, machine learning can be used to increase efficiency and avoid overloads, back offices can be automated, and customer support can be digitalized. This McKinsey article claims that mobile operators could double their operating cashflow through digital transformation.

However, not all telecoms are made the same and some do not have a culture that readily embraces transformation. McKinsey say that “experience shows that telcoms have historically only found success in transversal products (for example, security, IoT, and cloud services for regional small and medium-size segments)” and that in other areas, “telcoms have developed great ideas but have failed to successfully execute them”.

Another article from Bain & Co argues that only “one out of eight providers could be considered capital effective, meaning that they have gained at least 1 percentage point of market share each year over the past five years without having spent significantly more than their fair share of capital to do so”. As can be seen below, the rest of the sector is either caught in an efficiency trap (e.g. spent less capital than competitors but not gaining market share) or are just wasteful wit their capex spend.

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So, although there are many challenges for this sector, there is also many opportunities. As with every enterprise in this digital age, it will be those firms who can execute at scale that will likely to be the big winners. Pure telecommunications companies could become extinct or so radically altered in focus and diversity of operations that telecoms as a term may be redundant. Content production could be mixed with delivery to make joint content communication giants. Or IT services such as security, cloud services, analytics, automation and machine learning could be combined with next generation intelligent networks. Who knows! One thing is for sure though, the successful firms will be the ones with management teams that can execute a clear strategy profitably in a fast changing competitive sector.

The Next Wave

As part of my summer reading, I finished Paul Mason’s book “PostCapitalism: A Guide To Our Future” and although it’s an engaging read with many thoughtful insights, the concluding chapters on the future and policy implications were disappointing.

Mason points to many of the same issues as Martin Wolf did in his book (see post) as reasons for our current situation, namely the inherent instability in allowing private profit seeking banks to create fiat money, ineffective regulation (and the impossibility of effective regulation), increased financialization, global flow imbalances, aging populations, climate change and the disruptive impact of new information technologies. This 2005 paper from Gretta Krippner on the financialization of the US economy and reports from S&P (here and here) on the policy implementations of aging demographics are interesting sources cited in the book.

It is on the impact of the information technology and networks that Mason has the most interesting things to say. Mason uses Nikolai Kondratieff’s long wave theory on structural cycles of 50-60 years to frame the information technological age as the 5th wave. The graphic below tries to summarise one view of Kondratieff waves (and there are so many variations!) as per the book.

click to enlargeHistory Rhyming in Kondratieff Waves

The existence of such historical cycles are dismissed by many economists and historians, although this 2010 paper concludes there is a statistical justification in GDP data for the existence of such waves.

Mason shows his left wing disposition in arguing that a little known theory from Karl Marx’s 1858 notebook called the Fragment on Machines gives an insight into the future. The driving force of production is knowledge, Marx theorises, which is social and therefore the future system will have to develop the intellectual power of the worker, enhancing what Marx referred to as the general intellect. Mason contends that the intelligent network we are seeing unfold today fits into Marx’s theory as a proxy for the general intellect.

Mason also promotes the labour theory of value, as espoused by Marx and others, where automation is predicted to reduce the necessary labour in production and make work optional for many in a post-capitalist world. To highlight the relevance of this possibility, a 2013 study asserted that 47% of existing jobs in the US would be replaced by automation. References to Alexander Bogdanov’s sci-fi novel Red Star in 1909 may push the socialist utopia concept driven by the information age too far although Mason does give realistically harsh assessments of Soviet communism and other such misguided socialist experiments.

The network effect was first discussed by Theodore Vail of Bell Telephone 100 years ago with Robert Metcalfe, the inventor of the Ethernet switch, claiming in 1980 that a network’s value is the number of users squared. Mason argues that the intelligent network, whereby every person and thing (through the internet of things) is wired to the network, could even reduce the marginal cost of energy and physical goods in the same way the internet has for digital products. Many of these ideas are also present in Jeremy Rifken’s 2014 book “Zero Marginal Cost Society”. Mason further argues that the network makes it possible to organise production in a decentralized and collaborative way, utilizing neither the market nor management hierarchy, and that info-capitalism has created a new agent of change in history: the educated and connected person.

The weakest part of the book are the final chapters on possible policy responses which Mason calls Project Zero with the following aims: a zero carbon energy system, the production of products and services with near zero marginal costs, and the goal of pushing the necessary labour time close to zero for workers. Mason proposes a trial and error process using agent based modelling to be adopted by policy makers to test post-capitalism concepts. He refers to a Wiki-State, a state that acts like the business model of Wikipedia nurturing new economic forms without burdensome bureaucracies. Such a state should promote collaborative business models, suppress or socialize info-monopolies, end fractional banking (as per the Chicago Plan), and follow policies such as a minimum basic wage for all to accommodate the move to new ways of working. All very laudable but a bit too Red Star-ish for me!

Nonetheless, Mason’s book has some interesting arguments that make his book worth the read.

 

An aside – As highlighted above, there are many variations on the Kondratieff long wave out there. An interesting one is that included in a 2010 Allianz report which, using the 10 year average yield on the S&P500 as the determinant, asserts that we are actually entering the 6th Kondratieff wave (I have updated it to Q3 2015)!

click to enlarge6th Kondratieff Wave

Looking through some of the mountain of theories on long waves reminds me of a 2004 quote from Benoit Mandelbrot that “Human nature yearns to see order and hierarchy in the world. It will invent it if it cannot find it.