As we enter a week where further market turmoil is likely against a background of further tensions between the US and China over the Huawei arrest, the climax of the Brexit debacle, and the yellow vest protests in France. All these issues can and will be resolved eventually but they pale in comparison to the political inaction over the latest climate change reports.
The US government, in the form of the United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), in a report in November concluded that “the evidence of human-caused climate change is overwhelming and continues to strengthen, that the impacts of climate change are intensifying across the country, and that climate-related threats to Americans’ physical, social, and economic well-being are rising” and warned that “these impacts are projected to intensify—but how much they intensify will depend on actions taken to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the risks from climate change now and in the coming decades”. Of course, the Orange One again demonstrated his supreme myopic attitude with the dismissal “I don’t believe it”.
We now have the black comedy of oil producing states such as the US, Russia and Saudi Arabia arguing over whether to “welcome” or just “note” the latest IPCC report this week at the UN climate talks, known as COP24. The IPCC report on the impacts of a temperature rise of 1.5°C was launched last October and is a sobering read. The IPCC again states with a high level of confidence that “human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels, with a likely range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C” and that “global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate”.
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In order to avoid warming above 1.5°C, the world needs “global net anthropogenic CO2 emissions decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60% interquartile range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range)”. For limiting global warming to below 2°C, emissions need to “decline by about 25% by 2030 in most pathways (10–30% interquartile range) and reach net zero around 2070 (2065–2080 interquartile range)”.
Let’s face it, given the current political leadership across the globe, such declines are just fantasy. And I find that really depressing. The plea of David Attenborough at COP24 last week for leaders in the world to lead looks set to fall on deaf ears. Attenborough worryingly stated that “the continuation of our civilisations and the natural world upon which we depend, is in your hands (i.e. our leaders)”.
We’re pretty much toast then….
Posted in Climate Change
Tagged 5th assessment, above 1.5°C, agricultural productivity, anthropogenic drivers, anthropogenic greenhouse gas, atmospheric concentrations, biological carbon stores, carbon dioxide, carbon emission, climate change, climate change resilience, climate models, climate resilient pathways, climate system, climate warming, COP24, decarbonized economy, emissions reductions, geological data sets, global warming, greenhouse gas emissions, IPCC, IPCC 2018 report, methane, methane hydrates, National Academy of Sciences, nitrous oxide, ocean carbon sinks, Paris Agreement, permafrost thaw, PNAS, population growth, pre-industrial temperatures, sea level, soil erosion, synthesis reports, tipping elements, Trump climate change, UN climate talks, uninhabitable, USGCRP
In an opinion piece in the FT in 2008, Alan Greenspan stated that any risk model is “an abstraction from the full detail of the real world”. He talked about never being able to anticipate discontinuities in financial markets, unknown unknowns if you like. It is therefore depressing to see articles talk about the “VaR shock” that resulted in the Swissie from the decision of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) to lift the cap on its FX rate on the 15th of January (examples here from the Economist and here in the FTAlphaVille). If traders and banks are parameterising their models from periods of unrepresentative low volatility or from periods when artificial central bank caps are in place, then I worry that they are not even adequately considering known unknowns, let alone unknown unknowns. Have we learned nothing?
Of course, anybody with a brain knows (that excludes traders and bankers then!) of the weaknesses in the value-at-risk measure so beloved in modern risk management (see Nassim Taleb and Barry Schachter quotes from the mid 1990s on Quotes page). I tend to agree with David Einhorn when, in 2008, he compared the metric as being like “an airbag that works all the time, except when you have a car accident“. A piece in the New York Times by Joe Nocera from 2009 is worth a read to remind oneself of the sad topic.
This brings me to the insurance sector. European insurance regulation is moving rapidly towards risk based capital with VaR and T-VaR at its heart. Solvency II calibrates capital at 99.5% VaR whilst the Swiss Solvency Test is at 99% T-VaR (which is approximately equal to 99.5%VaR). The specialty insurance and reinsurance sector is currently going through a frenzy of deals due to pricing and over-capitalisation pressures. The recently announced Partner/AXIS deal follows hot on the heels of XL/Catlin and RenRe/Platinum merger announcements. Indeed, it’s beginning to look like the closing hours of a swinger’s party with a grab for the bowl of keys! Despite the trend being unattractive to investors, it highlights the need to take out capacity and overhead expenses for the sector.
I have posted previously on the impact of reduced pricing on risk profiles, shifting and fattening distributions. The graphic below is the result of an exercise in trying to reflect where I think the market is going for some businesses in the market today. Taking previously published distributions (as per this post), I estimated a “base” profile (I prefer them with profits and losses left to right) of a phantom specialty re/insurer. To illustrate the impact of the current market conditions, I then fattened the tail to account for the dilution of terms and conditions (effectively reducing risk adjusted premia further without having a visible impact on profits in a low loss environment). I also added risks outside of the 99.5%VaR/99%T-VaR regulatory levels whilst increasing the profit profile to reflect an increase in risk appetite to reflect pressures to maintain target profits. This resulted in a decrease in expected profit of approx. 20% and an increase in the 99.5%VaR and 99.5%T-VaR of 45% and 50% respectively. The impact on ROEs (being expected profit divided by capital at 99.5%VaR or T-VaR) shows that a headline 15% can quickly deteriorate to a 7-8% due to loosening of T&Cs and the addition of some tail risk.
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For what it is worth, T-VaR (despite its shortfalls) is my preferred metric over VaR given its relative superior measurement of tail risk and the 99.5%T-VaR is where I would prefer to analyse firms to take account of accumulating downside risks.
The above exercise reflects where I suspect the market is headed through 2015 and into 2016 (more risky profiles, lower operating ROEs). As Solvency II will come in from 2016, introducing the deeply flawed VaR metric at this stage in the market may prove to be inappropriate timing, especially if too much reliance is placed upon VaR models by investors and regulators. The “full detail of the real world” today and in the future is where the focus of such stakeholders should be, with much less emphasis on what the models, calibrated on what came before, say.
Posted in Insurance Market, Insurance Models
Tagged 1 in 10000 return period, 99% T-VaR, 99.5% VaR, adverse selection, Alan Greenspan, Barry Schachter, climate models, David Einhorn, deeply flawed VaR metric, dilution of terms and conditions, discontinuities in financial markets, economic capital models, economic modelling, European insurance regulation, exchange rates, fat tails, financial engineering, financial innovation, financial models, FTAlphaVille, game theory, imperfect art of modelling, insurance capital models, insurance pricing pressure, internal capital models, internal models, Joe Nocera, loss exceedance probability distribution, modern risk management, Nassim Taleb, New York Times, probability models, probability of default, probability of occurrence, reducing risk adjusted premiums, Return on equity, return period, risk based capital, risk model, solvency ii, Solvency II calibration, Solvency II standard formula, specialty insurance sector, Swiss National Bank, Swiss Solvency Test, Swissie, tail value at risk, Tails of VaR, the Economist, unknown unknowns, unrepresentative low volatility, value at risk, VaR and T-VaR, VaR shock